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In recent years, there has been a resurgence of civil disobedience
over public land policy in the West, sometimes characterized by
armed confrontations between ranchers and federal officials. This
trend reflects renewed assertions that applicable positive law violates
the natural rights (sometimes of purportedly divine origin) of
ranchers and other land users, particularly under the prior appropri-
ation doctrine and grounded in Lockean theories of property. At the
same time, Native Americans and environmental activists have also
relied on civil disobedience to assert natural rights to a healthy
environment based on public trust, fundamental human rights, and
other principles. This Article explores the legitimacy of natural law
assertions that prior appropriation justifies private property rights
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in federal grazing resources. A subsequent article will evaluate the
legitimacy of related assertions of natural law to support the public
trust doctrine and other legal theories to support environmental
protection.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of civil disobedience
to support natural law-based arguments regarding public lands and
other resources.1 Some property rights advocates, particularly a
discrete group of western ranchers, rely in part on a form of natural
law that might be characterized as rigidly prescriptive,2 and often
theistic.3 Environmental advocates rely on public trust principles
and assertions of fundamental human rights that also have po-
tential origins in natural law.
Both groups raise essential questions about the extent to which
land and other natural resources are public or private, their le-
gitimate uses, and the protections they deserve. Reconciling the
validity of these claims is deceptively difficult. Neither side can
reject the claims of the other by asserting the invalidity of natural
law per se to interpret or fill in gaps in positive law, without
undercutting the validity of their own arguments.
This Article evaluates the source and applicability of the prior
appropriation doctrine to support some western ranchers’ claims to
property rights in public grazing lands and resources.4 This Article
does not challenge the legitimacy of using civil disobedience to
support those arguments. There is a long and noble history in the
United States of using civil disobedience to protest government ac-
tion or inaction, and to propose legal reform5 based on alternative
1. See Matthew Piper, Jury Finds Defendants Not Guilty of Federal Charges in Oregon
Standoff, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 28, 2016, 3:34 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=
4515803&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc/BM4S-BD5Z].
2. See Kevin Sullivan & Juliet Eilperin, In the Nevada Desert, Bundy Family Warns of
Another Standoff, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/2016/
11/01/c45bdf4e-a04c-11e6-a44d-cc2898cfab06_story.html?utm_term=.9390e7735a99 [https://
perma.cc/5ZZP-8KUK].
3. See Sophia June, Bundy Supporters Celebrate Acquittal with a Shofar Performance,
WILLAMETTE WK. (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.wweek.com/news/2016/10/27/bundy-supporters-
celebrate-acquittal-with-a-shofar-performance/ [https://perma.cc/D4SR-T2SS]; Piper, supra
note 1.
4. In a future article, I will evaluate the source and application of the public trust
doctrine to support a range of new environmental protections. 
5. See Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 68 (1990).
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interpretations of law by discrete communities.6 There is an im-
portant difference, however, between the legitimacy of civil disobe-
dience as a tactic to advocate reform, and the legitimacy of the
reforms sought. Likewise, there is a difference between nonviolent
protest and the use of firearms, but that is also not my topic.
A. Resurgence of Civil Disobedience
When an Oregon jury acquitted the defendants in a federal pros-
ecution for alleged offenses related to the armed occupation of the
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, defendant Shawna Cox pro-
claimed triumphantly that “[w]e have God-given rights”7 and “I pray
that [people] understand that God gives us rights, not the govern-
ment. The government doesn’t have any rights.”8 Her proclamation
mirrors the views of ranchers in Nevada and elsewhere who dispute
the validity of federal land control.9
6. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50-52 (1983)
(identifying willingness to endure the consequences of civil disobedience as a measure of
commitment to alternative legal interpretations formed by discrete communities). 
7. June, supra note 3; see also Leah Sottile, Jury Acquits Ammon Bundy, Six Others for
Standoff at Oregon Wildlife Refuge, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/10/27/jury-acquits-leaders-of-armed-takeover-of-the-oregon-
wildlife-refuge-of-federal-conspiracy-charges/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a2bbaffd1a21 [https:
//perma.cc/XQ3B-F472] (reporting Ms. Cox to have said “Wake up America, and help us
restore the Constitution”).
8. Piper, supra note 1. Ms. Cox was also seen praying with former Utah State Senator
Mike Noel before willfully violating federal restrictions on motorized vehicle use through
federal land. See Christopher Smart, Mike Noel Warned Utah Woman Arrested in Oregon
Standoff Not to Go, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2016, 7:40 AM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.
php?id=3467893&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc/2Y8L-9G2E]. 
9. See John Dougherty, Bundy Trial Dismissed: ‘A Sad Day for America’s Public Lands’,
REVELATOR: ECOWATCH (Jan. 10, 2018, 8:55 AM), https://www.ecowatch.com/bundy-trial-
verdict-2524188297.html [https://perma.cc/M26G-EK8Y] (describing his own defense in the
criminal prosecution regarding the Clark County, Nevada standoff with federal officials,
Cliven Bundy said: “My defense is a 15-second defense: I graze my cattle only on Clark
County, Nev., land and I have no contract with the federal government.... This court has no
jurisdiction or authority over this matter. And I’ve put up with this court in America as a
political prisoner for two years”); Ken Ritter, 2 in Nevada Standoff Case Take Plea Deals,
Avoid 3rd Trial, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2017/10/24/2-
in-nevada-standoff-case-take-plea-deals-avoid-3rd-trial/ [https://perma.cc/L74U-LTGG] (“Cli-
ven Bundy says he doesn’t recognize federal authority over public land where he said his fam-
ily grazed cattle since the early 1900s. His dispute echoes a nearly half-century fight over
public lands involving ranchers in Nevada and the West, where the federal government
controls vast expanses of land.”). 
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The Malheur verdict might be explained as jury nullification.10
The defendants argued “that they were protesting government
overreach and posed no threat to the public.”11 However, the ar-
gument that one can overcome violations of federal criminal statutes
by proclaiming God-given rights, or some other form of fundamental
law, cannot be dismissed as the views of one or more lay defendants.
The government convicted some Malheur defendants in a separate
trial,12 but a jury also acquitted some defendants prosecuted for the
armed standoff with federal officials at the Bundy Ranch that led to
the Malheur protest.13 A federal judge later dismissed charges
against the Bundys because of prosecutorial misconduct in with-
holding evidence from the defendants, engendering mixed reactions
ranging from fear that the result would further provoke militia
movements to vindication of the defendants’ views.14 Moreover, this
10. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 1149, 1150-52, 1159 (1997) (defining jury nullification as “a jury’s ability to acquit a
criminal defendant despite finding facts that leave no reasonable doubt about violation of a
criminal statute,” and challenging the notion that nullification presumptively poses a threat
to the rule of law).
11. See Courtney Sherwood & Kirk Johnson, Bundy Brothers Acquitted in Takeover of
Oregon Wildlife Refuge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/us/
bundy-brothers-acquitted-in-takeover-of-oregon-wildlife-refuge.html [https://perma.cc/T4R5-
8QBL].
12. See Maxine Bernstein, Two Convicted and Two Acquitted of Conspiracy in Oregon
Occupation Trial, OREGONIAN: OREGONLIVE (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.oregonlive.com/
oregon-standoff/2017/03/oregon_occupation_trial.html [https://perma.cc/S29E-B85R].
13. See Julie Turkewitz, No Guilty Verdicts in Bundy Ranch Standoff Trial, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/us/bundy-trial-nevada-verdict.html
[https://perma.cc/Y8UY-QA5H]; Joshua Zaffos, The Bundy Bust-Up, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/articles/Bundy-bust-up-cliven-ammon-malheur-sage
brush-rebellion-payne-santilli [https://perma.cc/YL6R-LWHD] (describing the 2014 standoff
between armed ranchers and federal law enforcement officials). 
14. See Robert Anglen, Cliven Bundy Walks Free as Federal Judge Dimisses Bundy Ranch
Standoff Case, REPUBLIC (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:16 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/
arizona-investigations/2018/01/08/cliven-bundy-ranch-standoff-case-retried-federal-court-
ruling/1008051001/ [https://perma.cc/N98X-LAMV] (reporting that Cliven Bundy left the
courtroom to cheers of “liberty” and “freedom”); Dougherty, supra note 9 (presenting opposing
reactions to the dismissal); David French, Cliven Bundy Wins: Judge Cites ‘Flagrant’ Federal
Misconduct, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 9, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/01/
cliven-bundy-case-dismissed-judge-gloria-navarro-cites-flagrant-federal-misconduct-bureau-
land-management/ [https://perma.cc/6DWS-64MK] (expressing fears that the dismissal would
embolden Bundy supporters); Tom Porter, Cliven Bundy Mistrial: How a Nevada Rancher
Became an Icon for the Far-Right Militia Movement, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 11, 2018, 11:48 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/cliven-bundy-mistrial-how-nevada-rancher-became-icon-far-right-
militia-776727 [https://perma.cc/TMQ4-3BNA]; Amelia Templeton et al., The Bundys Go Free
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was not the first time that western ranchers had disobeyed positive
law to protest or resist what they viewed as excessive federal control
of their livestock and grazing lands.15
At the other side of the political-environmental spectrum, ad-
vocates have also recently resorted to civil disobedience to protest
actions that may contribute to climate change.16 Environmentalists
hail judicial willingness to consider that defense as “groundbreak-
ing” and “precedent-setting.”17
B. Resurgence of Natural Law
Some ranchers cite natural law in various forms to claim vested
property rights in public lands. Combining prior appropriation of
water and forage, Cliven Bundy reportedly told a Ph.D candidate
researching early Mormon views of public land policy that, “[f]rom
the moment their ancestors’ horses took a sip of water or ate the
grass, ‘a beneficial use of a renewable resource’ was created.”18
in Nevada—And Their Dismissal Reverberates Across Oregon, OR. PUB. BROADCASTING (Jan.
8, 2018, 5:37 PM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/cliven-bundy-nevada-oregon-bureau-land-
management-government-case-dismissed/ [https://perma.cc/XK8E-BV6F] (citing views of “mi-
litia” and “patriot groups” that the dismissal vindicated their beliefs). 
15. See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911) (describing a rancher’s
threat to resist a government effort to prevent illegal grazing); Chournos v. United States, 193
F.2d 321, 323 (10th Cir. 1951) (describing open defiance of Range Manager’s order to keep
livestock off particular federal lands); Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of
Grass, Ground, and Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721, 804-05 (2005) (quoting a High Country
News article from 2000 regarding retaking by ranchers of cattle seized by Bureau of Land
Management officials for unpermitted grazing in National Monument).
16. See, e.g., State v. Klapstein, No. 15-CR-16-414, Order & Mem. at 5-6 (Minn. 9th Dist.
Ct. Oct. 11, 2017) (preserving necessity defense in criminal trespass case involving four
climate change protesters’ actions to close public utility pipelines, but explaining high burden
to prove necessity based on “danger of imminent physical harm” and “a direct causal
connection between breaking the law and preventing the harm”); Blake Nicholson, Activist
on Trial Wants More Time for ‘Necessity’ Defense, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 3, 2017, 1:40 PM), https://
www. usnews.com/news/best-states/north-dakota/articles/2017-11-03/activist-on-trial-wants-
more-time-for-necessity-defense [https://perma.cc/4L5D-SX8N] (describing efforts by Standing
Rock protester to invoke necessity defense to justify civil disobedience). But see State v. Sahr,
470 N.W.2d 185, 193 (N.D. 1991) (rejecting assertion of necessity defense in criminal trespass
case against abortion protesters). 
17. See Jessica Corbett, Victory for ‘Valve Turners’ as Judge Allows ‘Necessity Defense’ for
Climate Trial, COMMON DREAMS (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/
10/17/victory-valve-turners-judge-allows-necessity-defense-climate-trial [https://perma.cc/7W
B4-V9KV].
18. Betsy Gaines Quammen, The War for the West Rages On, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016),
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Speaking in his own defense at the trial over the Bunkerville,
Nevada armed standoff, Cliven’s son, Ryan Bundy, asserted
“inalienable rights” to grazing on public lands.19 Some ranchers
signed, and others considered signing, letters to the federal gov-
ernment “denying federal authority to regulate grazing” on federal
lands, and unilaterally revoking their own grazing permits.20 Some
lawyers who represent ranchers have asserted similar claims in law
journals and elsewhere.21
It is difficult to know how many ranchers assert property rights
to federal lands through prior use, but I do not presume that these
views are universal. Apparently, at least a significant number of
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/30/opinion/the-war-for-the-west-rages-on.html [https://
perma.cc/G7NA-6R83] (quoting Cliven Bundy). Bundy then reportedly said:
That’s how our rights are created.... So now we have created them and we use
them, make beneficial use of them, and then we protect them. And that’s sort of
a natural law, and that’s what the rancher has done. That’s how he has his
rights. And that’s what the range war, the Bundy war, is all about right now, it’s
really protecting those three things: our life, liberty and our property.
Id.
19.  See Tay Wiles, How Ryan Bundy Sees the West, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.hcn.org/issues/49.22/justice-how-ryan-bundy-sees-the-west-cliven-bundy-bunker
ville-trial/ [https://perma.cc/N4B9-XRM2]; see also R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND,
WESTERN ANGER: THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 12-13, 118-19,
123-42 (1993) (dating calls for privatization of federal lands to at least 1973, grounded in
libertarian economic theory and political philosophy); WAYNE HAGE, STORM OVER RANGE-
LANDS: PRIVATE RIGHTS IN FEDERAL LANDS 84-86 (3d ed. 1994) (linking alleged rights of
western settlers to natural law theory); Nora Simon, Oregon Standoff: A Timeline of How the
Confrontation Unfolded, OREGONLIVE (Feb. 9, 2017, 3:51 PM), https://www.oregonlive.com/
pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/01/oregon_standoff_a_timeline_of.html [https://perma.
cc/Q23B-2HLB]; Sullivan & Eilperin, supra note 2.
20. See Tay Wiles, Malheur Occupation Impacts Linger Throughout the West, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/articles/ammon-bundy-malheur-standoff-
effects-sagebrush-rebellion [https://perma.cc/4558-FU94] (describing New Mexico rancher
Adrian Sewell’s letter, which he subsequently appears to have withdrawn, and meetings at
which Utah ranchers considered similar action). The form letters, addressed to the Solicitor
General of the United States, read: “I am hereby giving notice of termination of all contracts
between me and the Bureau of Land Management and United States Forest Service—I shall
no longer require their help in managing my ranch.” Id.
21. See Frank J. Falen & Karen Budd-Falen, The Right to Graze Livestock on the Federal
Lands: The Historical Development of Western Grazing Rights, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 505, 507-08
(1994); Marc Stimpert, Counterpoint: Opportunities Lost and Opportunities Gained:
Separating Truth from Myth in the Western Ranching Debate, 36 ENVTL. L. 481, 484, 486, 488
(2006); Wiles, supra note 19 (explaining that Cliven Bundy’s lawyer, Bret Whipple, asserted
his client had inalienable rights to grazing permits).
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western ranchers share these views, but some prefer anonymity.22
Other ranching representatives advocate balance between public
and private uses and values on public lands.23 Because of these
diverse views, I refer to those ranchers and their attorneys who
espouse natural rights views collectively as “natural law ranch
advocates.”
These natural law claims also resonate with the populist de-
scription of western rugged individualism in popular literature and
film.24 The rugged individualism narrative might help explain the
jury verdicts in the Malheur and Nevada standoff cases25 in the
face of significant evidence demonstrating federal law violations.26
22. E-mail from Professor Michele Straube, Founding Dir., Envtl. Dispute Resolution
Program: Wallace Stegner Ctr. for Land, Res. & Env’t, to author (Aug. 30, 2018, 7:13 AM) (on
file with author).
23. See Toward a Productive & Healthy West, W. LAND OWNER’S ALLIANCE, https://
westernlandowners.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Toward-a-Healthy-and-Productive-West.
pdf [https://perma.cc/B8EX-QU5A] (undated statement sponsored by the Western Landowners
Alliance, the Family Farm Alliance, the Rural Voices for Conservation Alliance, and Partners
for Conservation, and signed by a large number of western ranches).
24. See George Cameron Coggins et al., The Law of Public Rangeland Management I: The
Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 539 n.17, 559 (1982) [hereinafter
Public Rangeland Management I] (alluding to “parochial attitudes in the West” and “an
antifederal attitude, sometimes labeled ‘frontier individualism,’” and noting rancher “pride
in a certain frontier individualism, usually manifested as opposition to all things federal
except federal money”); Donahue, supra note 15, at 722, 740, 769-74, 790-803 (identifying and
critiquing the “cowboy myth” as it relates to federal grazing policies). But see Stimpert, supra
note 21, at 524-29 (defending the legitimacy of western ranching families, lifestyles, and
economies); Cheryl K. Chumley, Cliven Bundy Case Highlights What Ronald Reagan Warned,
WASH. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/ jan/9/cliven-bundy-
case-highlights-what-ronald-reagan-wa/ [https://perma.cc/N7P8-BVMB] (lauding Bundy
dismissal as victory of “[w]estern cowboy pragmatism and independence [over] East Coast
elitism”). 
25. See Sottile, supra note 7 (“For these defendants and these people, having a firearm ...
[is] as much a statement of their rural culture as a cowboy hat or a pair of jeans. I think the
jury believed at the end of the day that that’s why the guns were there.” (quoting defense
attorney Michael Schindler)).
26. In the Malheur prosecution, federal prosecutors produced significant physical evidence
that defendants illegally possessed and used firearms on federal property. See Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Dist. of Nev., Fourteen Additional Defendants Charged for Felony Crimes
Related to 2014 Standoff in Nevada (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nv/pr/
fourteen-additional-defendants-charged-felony-crimes-related-2014-standoff-nevada [https://
perma.cc/BSU8-HEKH]. In a later prosecution, however, a federal jury convicted four of the
other participants on felony conspiracy and other charges. See Dougherty, supra note 9. The
District Court dismissed charges in one of the Bundy Ranch prosecutions on procedural
grounds. See id.
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Similarly, some environmentalists argue that civil disobedience is
necessary due to positive law’s failure to prevent or mitigate climate
change or other environmental harms, relying on arguments that
sound in natural law.27
Renewed reliance on natural law is not limited to the legal and
policy debate over public lands, climate change, or other natural
resources. Some recent scholarship calls for the resurgence of nat-
ural law,28 and arguments grounded in natural law pervade divisive
aspects of the nation’s current political discourse. Opponents of
same-sex marriage,29 opponents of publicly required insurance for
birth control,30 proponents of the right to bear arms,31 and advocates
for religious liberty have invoked natural law.32 The belief that
religiously based natural law can override positive law is resurging
in widespread ways that may also reflect changes in the U.S.
27. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; infra CONCLUSION.B.
28. See Hadley Arkes, A Natural Law Manifesto or an Appeal from the Old Jurisprudence
to the New, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1245, 1275 (2012); Daniel R. Heimbach, Natural Law in
the Public Square, 2 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 685, 685-86 (2008); R. H. Helmholz, Judicial Review
and the Law of Nature, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 417, 434 (2013); Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming
the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33, 86
(1997). 
29. See Manya A. Brachear, Gay Marriage vs. Natural Law: Catholic Leaders Take Differ-
ent Tack as State Lawmakers Near Action, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 30, 2012), https://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2012-12-30-ct-met-gay-marriage-natural-law-20121230-story.html
[https://perma.cc/Y8GJ-FMXH] (quoting Chicago Cardinal Francis George as objecting that
“[m]arriage comes to us from nature”). 
30. See David Ingram, White House Fights Catholic Church Subpoena on Birth Control,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2013, 8:37 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/05/white-
house-fights-catholic-church_n_3024899.html [https://perma.cc/2DYN-A5GP] (“The Catholic
Church teaches that artificial birth control is sinful because it violates natural law.”). 
31. See Andrew P. Napolitano, Guns and Freedom, FOX NEWS (Jan. 10, 2013), http://
www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/01/10/guns-and-freedom.html [https://perma.cc/F6NE-X8W2]
(rooting the right to bear arms in the Declaration of Independence and its invocation of “the
ancient principles of the natural law that have animated the Judeo-Christian tradition in the
West”).
32. See Paula K. Gerrett, Kim Davis Isn’t Fighting for Religious Freedom, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kim-davis-isnt-fighting-for-reli
gious-freedom_b_8080008.html [https://perma.cc/5LPN-RKPN] (arguing that the debate over
Kentucky County Clerk Kim Davis’s refusal to conduct gay marriages “isn’t actually about gay
marriage or religious freedom. This debate is over civil v[ersus] natural law, and it’s a debate
that we have engaged in throughout history. It is about the meaning of law in this country.
Indeed, it is about the very soul of democracy.”). 
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political climate, including the wave of populist supporters who
elected President Donald Trump.33
In its most extreme form, proponents of theologically grounded
natural law suggest that their obligation to obey civil law is second-
ary to their religious beliefs. An organization called “Dependence-
onGod.com” published advertisements in major daily newspapers
proclaiming a “Declaration of Dependence Upon God and His Holy
Bible,” signed by Evangelical religious leaders, business owners,
attorneys, and politicians.34 One Bundy supporter cited the dis-
missal of their prosecution as a case of divine intervention, and
linked the public land debate to other issues of conservative social
policy: “There’s a higher power in control.... Federal land is going to
go back to the states. Abortion is going to stop, same-sex marriage
is going to stop. Otherwise God is going to destroy this country.”35
These assertions of theocratic supremacy are reminiscent of the di-
vide among Puritans in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, a debate one
author asserts has not yet been resolved in the United States.36
33. See David Leonhardt, Trump Flirts with Theocracy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/opinion/trump-flirts-with-theocracy.html [https://perma.
cc/YHU6-V6KN]; Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Photo Surfaces of Evangelical Pastors Laying Hands
on Trump in the Oval Office, WASH. POST (July 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/07/12/photo-surfaces-of-evangelical-pastors-laying-hands-on-
trump-in-the-oval-office/?utm_term=.ced22fdbdf05 [https://perma.cc/X8G2-6RQJ].
34. Declaration of Dependence Upon God and His Holy Bible, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2016,
at B3. The “Declaration” begins with the same words as the Declaration of Independence and
adds: “Since our Creator gave us these rights, we declare that no government has the right
to take them away. Among these rights is the right to exercise our Christian beliefs as put
forth in God’s Holy Bible.” Id. After proclaiming that these include specific rights such as life
beginning at conception, and marriage as a union between one man and one woman, the
document asserts the signatories’ “constitutional rights as Americans to follow these time
honored Christian beliefs—commit to conducting our churches, ministries, businesses, and
personal lives in accordance with our Christian faith and choose to obey God rather than
man.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Quammen, supra note 18 (arguing that the difference
between the Bundys and other ranch advocates is that the Bundys “believe God is on their
side”).
35. Templeton et al., supra note 14.
36. See JOHN M. BARRY, ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN SOUL:
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE BIRTH OF LIBERTY 151, 206 (2012) (describing the debate over “the
role of government in religion and of the reverse, the role of religion in the government” as “a
fissure in America, a fault line which would rive America all the way to the present”); see also
JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF
THE RADICAL RIGHT 230 (2016) (identifying Calvinist roots in extreme libertarian market
theories among those who “crusaded against abortion, homosexuality, feminism, and modern
science that conflicted with their teachings”). 
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C. The Tension with Positive Law
As explained in detail in Part II,37 federal authority over public
natural resources rests on the positive law in the Property Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, statutes and regulations adopted pursuant
to that authority, and judicial decisions interpreting those texts.38
The Property Clause grants the federal government plenary author-
ity over its public lands.39 Federal courts have upheld a significant
body of federal land management statutes40 against challenges to
their scope and effect.41 Courts have rejected claims challenging the
legitimacy of federal regulation of grazing on federal land,42 or as-
serting private property rights to those lands.43 Most recently, in a
federal government trespass action against a vocal natural law
ranch advocate, the Ninth Circuit held that existing water rights did
not support an easement by necessity to graze livestock on public
lands without a permit.44
37. See infra Part II.B.1.
38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see Coggins et al., supra note 24, at 569-72, 593-94. 
39. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976).
40. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-87 (2012);
National Park Service and Related Programs, 54 U.S.C. §§ 100101-104907 (Supp. II 2014);
National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2012). 
41. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 854 (9th Cir. 2002)
(upholding federal authority over national wildlife refuges). 
42. See McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359-60 (1922) (upholding conviction for
obstructing passage of competing grazing users over public land); Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523, 538 (1911) (upholding injunction against grazing on federal forest reserve without
required permit); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897) (upholding con-
stitutionality of Unlawful Enclosures Act); Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d
1397, 1403-04 (10th Cir. 1976) (upholding federal authority to revoke grazing permits for reg-
ulatory violations); Chournos v. United States, 193 F.2d 321, 323 (10th Cir. 1952) (upholding
requirement for grazing permits and holding that a “livestock owner does not have the right
to take matters into his own hands and graze public lands without a permit”).
43. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (rejecting argument that the Fifth
Amendment required compensation for value of grazing permits because permits were
revocable and conveyed no property rights); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293, 296 (10th Cir.
1951) (holding that in determining just compensation for lands appropriated for military
purposes, the jury could not consider value due to grazing permits); Osborne v. United States,
145 F.2d 892, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1944) (holding that condemnation of ranch for military
purposes did not require compensation for value added by federal grazing permits, which were
mere revocable licenses). 
44. See United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 719-20 (9th Cir. 2016). E. Wayne
Hage, now deceased, authored STORM OVER RANGELANDS: PRIVATE RIGHTS IN FEDERAL
LANDS, asserting rights to graze on public lands based on natural law. Supra notes 18-20 and
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Natural law ranch advocates seek to refute this seemingly over-
whelming body of positive law through arguments of three distinct
kinds, reflecting different variations of natural law theory. At one
level, the theistic rhetoric used by Ms. Cox, the Bundys, and others
suggests a version of natural law in which religious precepts alone
are sufficient to override human positive law.45 That set of claims is
most summarily refuted as inconsistent with basic principles of
separation of church and state incorporated in the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment,46 and with contemporary American
legal thought and method.47
Viewed through a nonreligious lens, however, natural law ranch
advocates also assert two additional layers of natural law argu-
ments. First, there is a strong component of strict constructionist
constitutionalism in the views expressed by the Bundy family and
their allies, with an implication that the Constitution guarantees
ranchers certain inalienable rights to property and economic lib-
erty.48 Second, natural law ranch advocates argue that the right to
public grazing resources parallels the legal justification for the prior
appropriation doctrine in western water law, which arguably has
groundings in natural law.49 They assert that grazing resources are
as essential as water to western economies and ways of life, and are
therefore similarly subject to natural rights of appropriation; and
that ranchers and their forebears applied their labor to grazing
resources just as they did for water, justifying associated property
rights.50
accompanying text. His son, Wayne N. Hage, also refused to obtain grazing permits to use
public lands, and was also a defendant in the case. See Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d at 715-16.
45. See supra notes 7-8, 34 and accompanying text.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra Part I.A.3. 
47. See infra notes 204-29 and accompanying text.
48. See Quammen, supra note 18; Wiles, supra note 19.
49. See infra Part II.A.1. On the basic principles of prior appropriation law, see generally
ROBERT W. ADLER, ROBIN K. CRAIG & NOAH D. HALL, MODERN WATER LAW: PRIVATE
PROPERTY, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 1, 87-92 (2013). 
50. See Falen & Budd-Falen, supra note 21, at 507-08, 522; Stimpert, supra note 21, at
484-88, 494; Todd Macfarlane, A Realistic Assessment of Utah’s Role in the Current Public
Lands Debate, RANGEFIRE (Jan. 20, 2017), http://rangefire.us/2017/01/20/a-realistic-
assessment-of-utahs-role-in-the-current-public-lands-debate-by-todd-macfarlane/ [https://
perma.cc/8THY-JBAL]; Quammen, supra note 18. But see generally George Cameron Coggins
& Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The Commons
and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Public Rangeland Management II]
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This Article explores the legitimacy of natural law ranch advo-
cates’ arguments that the right to graze is analogous to the right to
water by prior appropriation. Part I places the natural law ranch
advocates’ arguments in context with a brief review of natural law
in U.S. legal history. Part I also demonstrates that the first two
layers of natural law argument described above were never rec-
ognized widely in U.S. constitutional law, and have been rejected
even if once part of the U.S. legal tradition. Part II evaluates the
prior appropriation issue in more detail, and suggests legitimate
reasons why grazing on public lands has been, and should be,
treated differently from appropriating water resources, as a matter
of both positive and natural law reasoning. This Article concludes
by explaining how resolution of the prior appropriation issue leads
inexorably to a similar issue regarding the natural law basis for the
public trust doctrine, which will be addressed in a later article.
I. NATURAL LAW IN U.S. LEGAL HISTORY
Natural law is the subject of extensive literature51 dating to Greek
and Roman legal philosophers,52 and it is neither prudent nor
necessary to attempt an exhaustive explanation here. Some
background is essential, however, to understand the potential role
of different natural law theories in ownership and control of public
resources, and the propriety of relying on natural law to advocate
for changes in positive law. Section A provides a primer on natural
law and its history, with a focus on the three layers of claims
suggested by natural law ranch advocates. Section B distills from
this analysis some key principles relevant to the manner in which
natural law and positive law might apply to those claims.
(addressing the legitimacy of federal land ownership and authority from a constitutional and
statutory perspective, though not addressing the natural law theories directly); Donahue,
supra note 15, at 730-36; Public Rangeland Management I, supra note 24, at 568-77, 593-98.
51. For a collection of sources until the middle of the twentieth century, see generally
Note, Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, 9 STAN. L. REV. 455 (1957). 
52. See Arkes, supra note 28, at 1248 (dating natural law philosophy at least to Aristotle);
Heimbach, supra note 28, at 689-91 (discussing natural law philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, and
Cicero); Note, supra note 51, at 459 nn.9-12 (identifying roots of natural law in Greece and
Rome). 
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A. Natural Law Primer
“Natural law” refers not to a single legal philosophy, but to a
series of theories of law that have evolved significantly over time.53
Although competing schools of natural law can reflect very different
philosophies of what law is and from where it derives, differences
are also explained by the social and political circumstances in which
the theories arise.54
To the extent that natural law is united by a common idea, it is
that some form of “fundamental law” exists through which positive
law adopted by political bodies can be derived and evaluated.55 The
asserted source of that fundamental law has varied considerably,
however, from revealed religion to human reason to a shared sense
of morality within a polity.56 Thus, although positive law and natu-
ral law could be seen as competing theories,57 the two are not nec-
essarily58 mutually exclusive. Under this view, positive law is the
means by which individual polities effectuate a society’s inter-
pretation of natural law,59 implement natural law given varying
53. See Albert W. Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt Against Natural Law,
36 PEPP. L. REV. 491, 493 (2009); David C. Bayne, The Supreme Court and the Natural Law,
1 DEPAUL L. REV. 216, 216 (1952); Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the
Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269, 2269 (2001); Heimbach,
supra note 28, at 688; Note, supra note 51, at 456-57, 456 n.2 (1957).
54. See John S. Harbison, Hohfeld and Herefords: The Concept of Property and the Law
of the Range, 22 N.M. L. REV. 459, 461, 498 (1992) (arguing that all rights are “historically
contingent,” and that law “is a product of social forces and a carrier of cultural meanings”). 
55. See EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 474, 478 (1994); George, supra note 53,
at 2269; Helmholz, supra note 28, at 418; Louis W. Hensler III, A Modest Reading of St.
Thomas Aquinas on the Connection Between Natural Law and Human Law, 43 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 153, 155 (2009); Note, supra note 51, at 457.
56. See supra note 55.
57. Note, supra note 51, at 473-74 (juxtaposing positive law and natural law as “opposing
positions”). 
58. According to those who advocate absolute, and particularly theistic versions of natural
law, one has an obligation to obey God’s commands even in the face of contrary positive law.
Under this view, natural law is not only necessary, but also sufficient, to create binding law
even in the absence of positive law. 
59. For example, natural law might suggest that killing is impermissible, but societies
might differ in what constitutes self-defense, or whether the death penalty is justified. 
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circumstances,60 or address matters not implicated by natural law.61
Conversely, the legitimacy or moral justness of positive law can be
assessed by reference to natural law. Legal positivism, by contrast,
suggests a sharp distinction between law and morality to ensure
fidelity to law independent of a judge’s (or anyone else’s) views of
morality.62
1. Natural Law in the Medieval Catholic Tradition
Despite the historical importance of Greek, Roman, and earlier
Christian natural law philosophy, the medieval Catholic tradition
is a logical starting point because of its relevance to the theistic
claims made by some natural law ranch advocates and some
contemporary scholars.63 St. Thomas Aquinas and other Catholic
scholars in the Middle Ages posited that God handed down or
“revealed” a set of fundamental moral precepts, such as the Ten
Commandments, that humans were bound to obey.64 Aquinas
nonetheless believed that natural law was accessible to humans
60. For example, natural law might suggest that individuals must contribute to the
general welfare, but one jurisdiction might choose property taxes and another one might
select sales taxes.
61. For example, natural law may have nothing to say about procedures for registering
automobiles to ensure the orderly administration of traffic safety.
62. For the classic modern defense of legal positivism, see H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 185-93 (3d ed. 2012); H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594-604 (1958) (explaining the evolution of legal positivism from the
ideas of utilitarian theorists Bentham and Austin); see also Alschuler, supra note 53, at 495-
97 (critiquing Justice Holmes’s view that natural law held no legitimacy for law that must
evolve constantly); Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution of the United States, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1046 (1994) (quoting Justice Frankfurter’s legal realism view that
natural law is nothing more than “what sensible and right-minded men do every day”); R.
George Wright, Is Natural Law Theory of Any Use in Constitutional Interpretation?, 4 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 463, 469-70 (1995) (“[Y]ou can invoke natural law to support anything you
want.” (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 50 (1980))). At least in the context
of constitutional interpretation, however, Ely rejected the terminological distinction between
“natural law” and “positivism” in favor of a distinction between “interpretivism” and “nonin-
terpretivism.” See ELY, supra, at 1.
63. For example, Robert George retains the theistic view that positive law is “morally good
or bad—just or unjust—depending on its conformity to the standards of a ‘natural,’ (viz.,
moral) law that is no mere human creation.” George, supra note 53, at 2269; see also
Helmholz, supra note 28, at 417 (suggesting that natural law posits “a necessary connection
between law and morality” implanted by God in the hearts of people).
64. See Note, supra note 51, at 475, 501 n.185.
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because God implanted a fundamental sense of morality into their
hearts.65 Individual governments might manifest those precepts
differently through their positive law; but if one believes these pre-
cepts come from deity, it is logical to view them as imperatives
through which positive law must be judged.66
Thomastic natural law differs greatly from a view of revealed nat-
ural law in which individuals—as opposed to governments through
legitimate authority—may decide whether to obey positive law.67
For example, some of the Malheur defendants,68 and a county clerk
in Kentucky who refused to exercise her positive law responsibility
to marry LGBT couples because it violated her religious beliefs,
asserted the latter, extreme view.69 However, because people are
naturally inclined to live in ordered societies, and because it is dif-
ficult for humans to agree on all applications of natural law, one
basic principle of natural law is that individuals must respect the
positive law of their societies until changed.70
This disclaimer in Thomastic (and later) theories of natural law
is challenging in the context of civil disobedience, and has troubled
those who, at times in our history, believed aspects of positive law
to be fundamentally immoral. The clearest example is slavery,
which the United States affirmatively sanctioned as a matter of
positive law in the U.S. Constitution,71 before adoption of the
65. See Helmholz, supra note 28, at 417. 
66. See id. at 420-21. One of the debates that shook Puritan New England, however, was
whether civil government should play any role in enforcing the “first table” of the Ten
Commandments, those Commandments that define humans’ responsibility to God, as opposed
to those Commandments that implicate human conduct within civil society (such as the
prohibition against murder). See BARRY, supra note 36, at 206.
67. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (describing the “Declaration of Dependence
Upon God and His Holy Bible”). 
68. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
69. See Gerrett, supra note 32.
70. See Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century: A Review of Edwin W.
Patterson’s Jurisprudence, Men and Ideas of the Law, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 468 (1954)
(describing the natural law “duty of obeying the positive law as founded on natural law itself
and ... subject to exception only in extreme cases”); Kirk, supra note 62, at 1042-43 (arguing
that it would be inconsistent with the “very existence of government” and lead to anarchy to
allow each individual to freely disobey positive law); Note, supra note 51, at 480 n.93, 484. 
71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (distinguishing between “free” and “other” persons,
changed by the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (Fugitive Slave Clause,
superseded by Thirteenth Amendment).
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Thirteenth Amendment.72 Radical abolitionists and some judges
found this positive law unconscionable, but others felt bound to obey
regardless of their individual moral views.73
This highlights the nature of civil disobedience, in which one
disobeys what one regards as an unjust law while accepting the
consequences of any resulting prosecution, as a means to communi-
cate disagreement and to precipitate change. Slavery, however, may
prove too much due to the clarity of the case ex post. Not every
disagreement with positive law is presumptively legitimate and,
particularly for issues in which there is widespread moral disagree-
ment within society, sanctioning disobedience with positive law
based on every individual’s personal views is anarchistic.74 Robert
Cover adopts a more nuanced view in the case of discrete com-
munities (such as the Amish and the Mennonites), whose alterna-
tive interpretations of law he asserted are entitled to legitimacy in
a pluralistic society, no less presumptively valid than those of
judges.75 One could argue that natural law ranch advocates
constitute such a community, whose internal normative worldview
legitimizes their alternative legal interpretations. I do not read
Cover, however, to negate the legal force of positive law and
definitive interpretation and application by the courts in the face of
such alternative legal views.
It makes sense that, during the profoundly religious medieval
period, Catholic theologians and legal scholars would propose a the-
ory of natural law rooted in absolute laws commanded by God. The
Catholic Church was a significant political and religious force that
72. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
73. In The Antelope, Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed, “[t]hat [slavery] is contrary
to the law of nature will scarcely be denied,” but held that one nation was not free to
contravene the positive law of another to enforce that precept. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66, 120-22 (1825). But see United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846
(C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, J., sitting as Circuit Justice) (upholding federal
government’s claim to seized French slave-trading vessel because slavery “is founded in a
violation of some of the first principles, which ought to govern nations. It is repugnant to the
great principles of Christian duty, the dictates of natural religion, the obligations of good faith
and morality, and the eternal maxims of social justice.”). For the classic explication, see
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 101-05 (1984).
74. See supra note 16 (regarding the relative willingness of courts to consider a necessity
defense in cases involving civil disobedience).
75. See Cover, supra note 6, at 50-53.
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competed with the coexisting feudal order to govern society.76 A
religious philosophy that promoted absolute obedience, in a society
with weak state control, helped to solidify the power of the Catholic
Church.77 Where a dominant institution held a monopoly in pro-
claiming God’s higher law, there was less risk that multiplicity of
interpretation would contribute to anarchy.78 Through excommun-
ication,79 the Inquisition,80 and other powers, the Church had direct
mechanisms to enforce its view of natural law.
2. Natural Law in the Enlightenment
Enlightenment natural law theory is particularly relevant here
because of its influence on the early American legal philosophy81 up-
on which natural law ranch advocates rely.82 During the Enlighten-
ment in Europe and colonial America, religiously derived natural
law evolved into a theory positing that moral principles that guide
human laws could be derived from “right reason” (rational thought)
based on fundamental principles of human nature.83 Enlightenment
76. See Philip S. Gorski, Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, and
Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, Ca. 1300 to 1700, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 138,
140 (2000) (noting the dominance of the Church in medieval society). 
77. See John Witte, Jr., Facts and Fiction About the History of the Separation of Church
and State, 48 J. CHURCH & ST. 15, 19 (2006).
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., G.W. BERNARD, THE KING’S REFORMATION: HENRY VIII AND THE REMAKING
OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH 34 (2005) (describing the potential for excommunication of King
Henry VIII over his divorce from Anne Boleyn).
80. See E. VACANDARD, THE INQUISITION: A CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE
COERCIVE POWER OF THE CHURCH 115-16, 138 (1908) (examining the Catholic Inquisition from
the standpoint of morality, justice, and religion).
81. It is doubtful that there was a dominant legal philosophy in colonial America, as
opposed to a wide range of influences from which the colonists drew and derived equally
varying views. See ELY, supra note 62, at 48-49. 
82. See supra notes 7-9, 18-19 and accompanying text.
83. See Arkes, supra note 28, at 1248 (rooting Enlightenment natural law in Kant’s theory
that all moral principles came from rational being); Heimbach, supra note 28, at 694-95
(explaining Grotius’s view that natural law is the product of “autonomous, non-regenerated
human reason,” and explaining the role of Enlightenment philosophers, such as Hobbes and
Rousseau, although claiming that the nonreligious nature of their work was responsible for
the abuses of the French revolution); Helmholz, supra note 28, at 419-21 (tracing natural law
roots in Europe from the twelfth through the nineteenth centuries); Kennedy, supra note 28,
at 44-47 (explaining Enlightenment natural law’s emphasis on “empiricism and rationalism”);
Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
1513, 1514 (2011) (identifying natural law as accessible to all humans through reason).
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philosophers still viewed natural law as universal, because it was
based on immutable characteristics of people and communities that
predated organized society.84 Therefore, natural law required no
state involvement for its development or enforcement, leading to
“prepolitical” rights and duties.85 Most Enlightenment legal and
political philosophers, however, retained a religious foundation for
natural law.86 That tradition may have inspired the political leaders
of the American Revolution87 to justify separation from England
based on “unalienable rights” “endowed by their Creator.”88
84. Note, supra note 51, at 461.
85. See Richard A. Epstein, How Spontaneous? How Regulated?: The Evolution of Property
Rights Systems, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2341, 2342 (2015); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 12 (1974); Note, supra note 51, at 461.
86. Those writers included Protestants such as Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf. See
Heimbach, supra note 28, at 694 (contrasting Grotius’s view that morality could be derived
from human reason but full acceptance depended on belief in God with the Calvinist view that
the only path to moral righteousness was through God); R. H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature
and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights in the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401,
407 (2007); Kirk, supra note 62, at 1037 (discussing the manner in which natural law was
“[p]rotestantiz[ed]” by Grotius and others).
87. See Epstein, supra note 85, at 2346 (discussing Locke’s theories of property);
Heimbach, supra note 28, at 694-95 (discussing the influence of Hobbes and Rousseau);
Helmholz, supra note 28, at 421 n.30 (quoting Blackstone); Morton J. Horwitz, The History
of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (1982) (linking the origins of
a private realm to the “natural rights liberalism of Locke”); Kennedy, supra note 28, at 44-46
(discussing the influence of Locke and Montesquieu on Jefferson); O’Scannlain, supra note 83,
at 1517 (noting Locke’s heavy influence on Jefferson); Wright, supra note 62, at 473
(discussing Lockean natural laws).
88. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see HANKS ET AL., supra note
55, at 479 (noting natural rights rhetoric dating to the Declaration of Independence); Arkes,
supra note 28, at 1246 (“The object of the Constitution ... was ‘to acquire a new security for
the possession or the recovery of those rights’ we already possess by nature.” (quoting James
Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 585, 585
(Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967))); id. at 1255 (“[T]he anchoring proposition of the
American Republic[ ] [is] ‘all men are created equal.’” (quoting Abraham Lincoln, U.S.
President, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863))); Note, supra note 51, at 487-88 (discussing
the “founding father approach” to natural law espoused by many Americans); infra Part I.B
(discussing the Declaration of Independence). But see Alschuler, supra note 53, at 491
(identifying Blackstone as “the principal teacher of law to American lawyers of the
revolutionary generation and the early republic”); George, supra note 53, at 2269, 2276
(discussing Jefferson’s appeal to natural rights in the Declaration of Independence, and
describing the founders’ belief in natural law as embodied in English common law); Kirk,
supra note 62, at 1039 (describing American political leaders at the time of the Constitutional
Convention as Blackstone disciples); O’Scannlain, supra note 83, at 1514 (“[T]he belief that
the Constitution embodies natural law principles ‘was not even the majority view among those
“framers” we would be likely to think of first.’” (quoting ELY, supra note 62, at 39)); id.
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Enlightenment philosophy continued to suggest that any posi-
tive law inconsistent with natural law was illegitimate or void.89
Notwithstanding the more egalitarian idea that natural law was
accessible to anyone through human reason, however, this theory
gave individuals no greater license to decide what constituted
binding law.90 Governments still dictated enforceable rules through
positive law, with judicial, legislative, and other mechanisms that
could conform positive law to natural law when necessary.91
Enlightenment philosophers reinforced the principle that natural
law required obedience to duly adopted positive law to guarantee
that society functioned and to ensure harmonious relations.92 Even
in an extreme case—such as the American Revolution—when a
society determined that existing positive law so violated “unalien-
able rights”93 that a radical change of government was justified,94
natural law demanded that it revolt through legal means.95
("[N]atural law and natural rights philosophies were not that broadly accepted [at the time
of the Constitution]; in fact, they were quite controversial." (quoting John Hart Ely, Foreword:
On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 25 (1978))). 
89. See Hemholz, supra note 86, at 420-21.
90. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1:120-41 (1765), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 388, 388 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“[E]very
man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so
valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce,
obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community has thought proper to
establish. And this species of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable, than
that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it.”).
91. See Helmholz, supra note 86, at 402. 
92. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 188-89 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947)
(1689) (arguing that legitimate laws passed by the consent of the people command obedience);
Steven Kautz, Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 435, 443 (1999)
(arguing that the Enlightenment philosophers recognized that obedience to legitimate positive
law was necessary to obtain liberty). 
93. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 88, para. 2. 
94. See Fuller, supra note 70, at 468 (suggesting that the duty to obey positive law might
be subject to exception in “extreme cases”). 
95. In the American Revolution, the Continental Congress was an official governmental
body even if it did not have the sanction of the English government. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 56 (1940) (describing the First Continental Congress as being
comprised of “the ambassadors of twelve distinct nations”). Contrast the process that
implemented the American Revolution from the mob rule that characterized the French
Revolution. See DAN EDELSTEIN, THE TERROR OF NATURAL RIGHT: REPUBLICANISM, THE CULT
OF NATURE, AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 20-21, 131-33 (2009) (describing the use of natural
law and natural rights to justify the reign of terror during the French Revolution, and
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Just as Catholic natural law reflected prevailing social, political,
and other circumstances, Enlightenment natural law reflected the
surrounding political and social milieu. Nation-states competed
against monarchs who asserted their divine right to rule by fiat
rather than by reason.96 The argument that individuals could de-
duce principles of law and morality through reason supported the
collective rights of people to self-govern.97
3. Natural Law in the Secular State
Beginning in the nineteenth century, much of Europe gradually
abandoned natural law in favor of the secular systems of positive
law reflected in civil codes and other sources.98 Even in England,
whose common law heritage gave rise to the natural law philoso-
phies of Locke, Blackstone, and Coke,99 utilitarian legal philoso-
phers such as Austin and Bentham led a positive-law transition that
is best reflected in modern times by the writings of H. L. A. Hart.100
Natural law in the American colonies, by contrast, initially
retained a religious tenor given the dominance of Protestant
society.101 That philosophy became less tenable as the colonies
comparing the French and American revolutions in their treatment of dissidents).
96. See Horwitz, supra note 87, at 1423 (discussing the tension between the emergence
of nation-states and notions of sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as well
as the philosophy that natural rights can set limits on state power).
97. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 90 (asserting that absolute rights are “few and simple”
but that people can derive secondary rights that are “far more numerous and more
complicated” from those fundamental rights).
98. See Note, supra note 51, at 462.
99. See supra notes 87-90, 177. 
100. See HART, supra note 62, at 268 (arguing that law was simply rules dictated by human
politics with no necessary connection to morality); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, supra note 62, at 599. Led by the scholarly writings of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, both theistic and Enlightenment versions of natural law similarly lost their hold in
the United States by the first half of the twentieth century. See Horwitz, supra note 87, at
1426; infra Part I.C. 
101. See SAMUEL ADAMS, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS (1772) (discussing religious
tolerance for Protestants, but not Catholics, and describing the rights of the Colonists as
Christians), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 90, at 394, 394-96;
Bayne, supra note 53, at 217 (“In the year 1764, James Otis expressed the fact that all laws
and government have ‘an everlasting foundation in the unchangeable will of God,’ ... [which
was] expressive of the tradition of natural law thinking that so characterized the entire
governmental philosophy of the United States from its conception.” (quoting JAMES OTIS, THE
RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (1764))); Kirk, supra note 62, at
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adopted principles of religious tolerance,102 expressed ultimately in
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.103 Along with
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,104 the Establish-
ment Clause ensures religious liberty by preventing the political or
legal dominance of any faith (or religion at all) in the United States.
The First Amendment, however, simultaneously limits the degree
to which religious text, philosophy, or any interpretation of religious
texts, dictate constitutional interpretation or any other aspect of
federal or state law.105
Thus, although religion influenced early American jurists,106 the
rhetoric and justification for natural law adopted a secular ground-
ing. Even if they believed in natural rights endowed by a Creator,
American natural law107 proponents argued that natural law was
based on universally accepted moral principles or legal maxims.108
As students of Blackstone,109 early American jurists believed that
natural law principles could be derived from a few fundamental and
commonly accepted natural rights of “prepolitical” people.110 To be
sure, religious natural law theories have continued in the United
States through the influence of Catholic111 and Evangelical112 legal
1038-39 (noting that most of the thirteen colonies adopted the Church of England as their
official religion, that the natural law teachings of Anglican preachers were “imparted from
American pulpits,” and that most of the Framers of the Constitution were Anglicans). 
102. See BARRY, supra note 36, at 389-90. 
103. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.”).
104. Id. (“Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise” of religion). 
105. See supra notes 103-04.
106. See Helmholz, supra note 86, at 401 (asserting that contemporary American lawyers
believed that principles of justice “were part of human nature, formed within [them] by God.
These principles were common to all men everywhere, they were immutable, and they pro-
vided the necessary foundation of all human law.”).
107. See Kirk, supra note 62, at 1040 (distinguishing between Enlightenment doctrines of
natural rights and traditional doctrines of natural law).
108. See Arkes, supra note 28, at 1254-56. Hamilton used this logic (“the nature and reason
of the thing”) in The Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 404, NO. 83, at 431,
NO. 84, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). 
109. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
111. See John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a
World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 848 (1991) (tracing
then-Senator Joe Biden’s belief in natural law to his Catholic upbringing); Hensler, supra note
55; Note, supra note 51, at 473 (noting that natural law was relegated to Catholic law
schools); O’Scannlain, supra note 83, at 1514 (citing a view of natural law as parochial and
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scholars, but those ideas have disappeared from formal legal de-
cisions.113 Indeed, the most ardent legal positivists among the U.S.
judiciary in recent years include conservatives such as Justice
Scalia and Judge Bork, whose ideological views most likely align
with advocates for natural law grounded in religion.114
The elimination of religion in natural law also prompted a shift
in which branches of government should determine how natural law
influences positive law. Judges in the religious natural law tradition
were free to declare void any law enacted through legislative,
executive, or even monarchial authority.115 Once natural law is
stripped of its theistic force, societies may adopt different govern-
mental systems to decide which moral concepts should govern
positive law. As explained below, that is what the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution did in adopting a democratic republic.116 Elected
branches of government make policy determinations about positive
law, for which they are accountable through the electoral process.117
Judges are not free to invalidate that law based solely on their own
notions of natural law or other sources of morality or policy, unless
a statute violates constitutional requirements.118 The federal and
state constitutions have become the “higher law” for purposes of
judicial review.119
specifically Catholic).
112. See, e.g., Heimbach, supra note 28, at 686 (discussing a resurgence of interest in nat-
ural law among evangelicals). 
113. See Heimbach, supra note 28, at 696 (decrying the rejection of religiously based
natural law in the twentieth century); Helmholz, supra note 86, at 402 (noting that natural
law “lost its hold on the common assumptions of most lawyers” by the end of the nineteenth
century); Kirk, supra note 62, at 1036 (citing the prevalence of judicial positivism since 1938);
Note, supra note 51, at 461-62 (noting that natural law was “banished” from judicial opinions
and legal education in the late nineteenth century); infra Part I.C. 
114. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 208-11 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855
(1989).
115. See Helmholz, supra note 86, at 420-21; see also Witte, Jr., supra note 77, at 19
(describing papal power over the civil government of the Roman Empire).
116. See infra Part I.B.
117. See George, supra note 53, at 2282.
118. See id.
119. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 108, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (identifying
a constitution as “a fundamental law” to which judges must be bound over all other sources
of law); George, supra note 53, at 2282; O’Scannlain, supra note 83, at 1514.
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This shift, however, has not eliminated the idea that some kind
of “fundamental law” necessarily plays a role in the legal process.120
Secular versions of natural law maintain that law cannot be
separated from morality, but that morality need not be tied to
religion.121 For example, Lon Fuller forged a procedural theory of
law as morality (which he referred to as “the internal morality of the
law”122) in which the legitimacy of positive law depends on a series
of moral precepts that legitimize positive law without dictating its
substantive content.123 Ronald Dworkin advocates that law derives
its legitimacy from “integrity.”124 John Hart Ely, who would elim-
inate the positive law/natural law dichotomy from a terminological
perspective, rejects the unconstrained use of extrinsic sources (or a
judge’s own view of morality) to reach constitutional decisions.125 He
believes it is appropriate, however, to interpret ambiguities and fill
interstitial gaps in constitutional texts with extrinsic sources to
ensure the integrity and inclusiveness of the political system and to
legitimate the democratic process through which substantive judg-
ments are made by elected officials.126 Robert Cover goes further,
arguing that there is room for diverse sets of normative structures
(“nomos”) discrete communities may embrace, leading to alterna-
tive—but equally valid—sets of legal interpretations.127 Some
writers advocate a more limited role for natural law as an interpre-
tive tool rather than a binding rule of decision,128 or to be used only
120. The classic modern defense of natural law in the face of H. L. A. Hart’s ardent
positivism, see supra note 62 and accompanying text, was Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and
Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630-63 (1958), and later
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 3-4 (rev. ed. 1969). Earlier, Fuller had distinguished
between law based on state force and moral imperatives. See LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN
QUEST OF ITSELF 2-15 (1940); see also Fuller, supra note 70, at 462-63; Kirk, supra note 62,
at 1045 (arguing that the private interpretation of natural law should not be used to settle
conflicts, but that natural law should help form the judgments of lawmakers).
121. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 28, at 39-40 (explaining that Fuller “still rejected the
providential origins of natural law”).
122. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 120, at 81.
123. See id. at 33-94 (identifying those precepts as rules that are transparent, prospective,
understandable, consistent, attainable, and enforced fairly and evenhandedly). 
124. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 191-92 (1986). 
125. See ELY, supra note 62, at 87-88.
126. See id.
127. See Cover, supra note 6, at 6-9. 
128. See O’Scannlain, supra note 83, at 1515, 1524-25 (arguing that natural law is useful
in helping judges go beyond the constitutional text to understand its original meaning). 
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in extreme circumstances such as slavery, genocide, or other patent
human rights violations.129 This prompts the question, of course, of
what constitutes a sufficiently “extreme” case to invoke natural law.
Others advocate a return to a jurisprudence in which jurists can rely
on natural law sources, some religious in origin,130 to safeguard
fundamental rights that predated the Constitution.131
These secular variations of natural law posited by U.S. legal
scholars differ significantly in focus, but reflect a common theme.
They seek to preserve the integrity of the processes of law and
democracy through which elected branches of government make
substantive policy decisions. They also help to ensure equality and
therefore equal participation in those processes, without dictating
the substance of those decisions by reference to moral guideposts
extrinsic to the Constitution or other positive law.
129. See Hensler, supra note 55, at 166 (advocating a limited role for natural law only when
“absolutely essential to the human law’s more limited goal”); Wright, supra note 62, at 486
(arguing that there must be cases, such as the legitimacy of slavery, where determinacy is
clear and preferable). Some assert that absolute faith in the dominance of positive law was
shaken by the horrors of fascism in World War II. See Note, supra note 51, at 463-64 (noting
that Hitler meticulously observed the formalities of the legal process, came to power by
constitutional means, and was elected by a plurality of the German people); see also Fuller,
supra note 70, at 465 (noting that the Nazis “came to power through the calculated
exploitation of legal forms”). That experience likely helps to explain the 1948 adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which one could view as an international statement
of positive law articulating those principles of human rights—or universally accepted moral
principles—to which all people are entitled regardless of the particular political environment
in which they reside. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, at 71, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948) (affirming the “equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family”).
130. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 55, at 153 (referring to a revival of natural law tradition
for “at least the last two decades”); Kennedy, supra note 28, at 36, 39 (referring to a natural
law revival). The source and legitimacy of natural law was also a significant issue during the
confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, as well
as the unsuccessful effort to confirm Judge Robert Bork. See Linda P. Campbell, Thomas’
Belief in “Higher Law” at Center Stage, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 18, 1991), http://articles.chicago
tribune.com/1991-08-18/news/9103010246_1_natural-law-natural-law-positive-law [https://
perma.cc/L495-S7FT]; Laurence H. Tribe, Clarence Thomas and “Natural Law,” N.Y. TIMES
(July 15, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/15/opinion/clarence-thomas-and-natural-law.
html [https://perma.cc/BE38-9VJK].
131. See Arkes, supra note 28, at 1254 (“The first generation of our jurists ... trace[d] their
judgments back to first principles ... that were usually not mentioned in the text of the
Constitution, because they were truths that had to be in place before one could even have a
constitution or a regime of law.”); see also Heimbach, supra note 28, at 685-86; Kennedy,
supra note 28, at 33 (approving of Justice Thomas’s implicit reliance on natural law). 
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Moreover, even under a secular understanding of natural law,
judges interpret and enforce statutory law where it is ambiguous or
has gaps, and decide cases under common law where no statutory
law applies. In that sense, some scholars identify common law as a
form of natural law.132 Absent legislative or constitutional man-
dates, judges apply reason to determine what rules best reflect and
promote shared community norms.133 Similarly, the concept of
equity, through which judges may relieve parties from strict re-
quirements of law, necessarily relies on recognized norms of what
is “fair” or “just.”134
The ability of judges to use natural law to influence decisions not
directly controlled by positive law,135 however, again does not allow
an individual to disobey positive law based on religious or other
personal beliefs.136 Although the Supreme Court has struck down
positive law as a violation of an individual’s right to free exercise of
religion,137 that required a judicial ruling. Disobedience is not
justified simply because positive law contravenes an individual’s
personal interpretation of natural law on other issues of public
policy,138 such as the relationship between private property and
public natural resources.139 Moreover, it has only occurred when
positive law has interfered directly with an individual’s or a group’s
exercise of their First Amendment rights.140
132. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 17-22 (1968)
(explaining common law as a community of judges in shaping rules from natural principles
of justice); George, supra note 53, at 2276 (placing English common law as a “positive
embodiment of the natural law”). 
133. See Dworkin, supra note 132, at 23-28 (citing as example that one should not be
allowed to profit from one’s own dishonesty); see also Horwitz, supra note 87, at 1425 (citing
the principle that “equity will not enforce unfair contracts”). 
134. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 108, at 540 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining
role of equity to prevent absolute legal rules from generating “some undue and unconscionable
advantage”). 
135. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (invalidating city ordinance
requiring individuals to obtain permit before distributing religious literature).
138. See supra note 70.
139. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
140. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 169
(2002) (striking down statute that required permit to engage in religious proselytizing,
anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 518 (1945) (invalidating statute requiring a permit before speaking to union organi-
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B. Natural Law in Formative U.S. Legal Documents
Some advocates for a resurgence of substantive natural law rely
in part on the text of foundational U.S. legal documents and the
American Revolution-era concept of divinely conveyed and, there-
fore, inalienable rights.141 The diminishing role of theistic natural
law in U.S. jurisprudence, however, began not with the positivist
school of law advocated by jurists and legal scholars in the early
twentieth century, as is sometimes claimed.142 The shift from
theocratic to democratic emphasis is evident in the American
Republic’s foundational legal texts.143
The Declaration of Independence contains the most famous Rev-
olutionary-era reference to natural law. While attributing a divine
source to natural rights, however, the Declaration also highlights
the critical role of positive law:
zation). 
141. See Arkes, supra note 28, at 1246-47, 1254 (arguing that the Constitution’s purpose
“was the securing of ... ‘natural rights,’” and to the extent natural law principles were not
mentioned explicitly in the Constitution, it was “because they were the truths that had to be
in place before one could even have a constitution or a regime of law” (first quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 84, at 578-79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961); then citing
Edward J. Erbele, The Right to Information Self-Determination, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 965, 1008
n.240)); George, supra note 53, at 2282 (expressing the softer view that the “Constitution
embodies our founders’ belief in natural law and natural rights,” as opposed to specific textual
support); Kennedy, supra note 28, at 34 (defending Justice Clarence Thomas’s jurisprudence
based on his “connectedness to both the mind and spirit of the Framers of the Constitution”);
O’Scannlain, supra note 83, at 1515-18 (arguing that natural law and natural rights were
“woven into the fabric of the Constitution”); see also Helmholz, supra note 86, at 404-07
(comprehensively chronicling natural law principles in the writings of the constitutional
Framers). The most extreme version of this belief, and one that one ordinarily would not think
necessary to mention or refute in a scholarly law review article, is the belief that Jesus Christ
was the author of the U.S. Constitution. See Shadee Ashtari, Tom DeLay Claims God Wrote
the Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2014, 6:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/02/20/tom-delay-god-constitution_n_4826503.html [https://perma.cc/VZT6-HST8].
142. See Alschuler, supra note 53, at 497 (identifying Justice Holmes as the source of the
“revolt against natural law” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
143. See Kirk, supra note 62, at 1039 (arguing that even though American political leaders
and jurists were Blackstone disciples, the Constitution was a “practical instrument of
government” rather than a “natural law document”); O’Scannlain, supra note 83, at 1514
(“[T]he belief that the Constitution embodies natural law principles ‘was not even the majority
view among those “framers” we would be likely to think of first.’” (quoting ELY, supra note 62,
at 39)).
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WHEN in the course of human events, it becomes necessary
for one people to dissolve the political bands which have con-
nected them with another, and to assume among the powers of
the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of
nature and of nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the
causes which impel them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed, by their Creator, with
certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, govern-
ments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from
the consent of the governed.144
The italicized portions signal ambivalence about the role of
natural law in the call for independence. By referencing “laws of
nature and of nature’s God” and “endowed by their Creator, with
certain unalienable rights,”145 the Declaration identifies deity as the
source of the rights asserted by the colonists.146 Some jurists and
scholars cite these words as “Exhibit A” in their case for renewal of
substantive natural law.147 The phrases “powers of the earth”148 and
“decent respect to the opinions of mankind,” however, reflect
Enlightenment natural law doctrine that the people, through their
established governments, dictate how they should be governed, and
by whom.149 The second paragraph clarifies that people establish
institutions to “secure these rights” through powers derived “from
144. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 88, paras. 1-2 (emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 28, at 50 (citing Clarence Thomas’s view that “the
Constitution should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the higher law principles
made manifest in the Declaration of Independence”); O’Scannlain, supra note 83, at 1516-17. 
148. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 88, para. 1.
149. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. Stephen Greenblatt went even farther
recently, arguing that Jefferson’s invocation of “the pursuit of happiness” reflected an evolving
agnosticism based on a Renaissance revival of the hedonistic theories advocated by the Roman
poet Lucretius, which subsequently influenced Enlightenment philosophy. See STEPHEN
GREENBLATT, THE SWERVE: HOW THE WORLD BECAME MODERN 262-63 (2011). It is not clear,
however, how this theory can be reconciled with the Declaration’s reference to God.
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the consent of the governed.”150 That is also entirely consistent with
the distinction between natural rights and natural law.151
The authors of the Declaration thus intended to break from
existing understanding of natural law and establish a government,
as later described by Lincoln, “of the people, by the people, for the
people.”152 Being bound by English positive law, however, the au-
thors needed to rely on authority other than English law to justify
independence. The Declaration’s reliance on French Enlightenment
political philosophy served that function, as well as the accompany-
ing political purpose of soliciting French financial and military
assistance.153
Notably, once the Colonies declared independence, neither of the
two most important formative U.S. legal documents that followed
embraced natural law significantly.154 The Articles of Confederation
cite neither natural law nor the “laws of God” as the source of
substantive rights or principles of government.155 The Constitution,
in turn, begins with a Preamble that reads even more clearly as
positive law:
We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare,
and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,
150. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 88, para. 2.
151. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
152. Abraham Lincoln, U.S. President, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in THIS FIERY
TRIAL 183-84 (William E. Gienapp ed., 2002).
153. See Kirk, supra note 62, at 1040 (asserting that, as Francophiles, Jefferson and others
adopted the rhetoric of Montesquieu and other French political philosophers to curry favor
with the French political establishment).
154. Some proponents of religiously grounded natural law minimize the significance of this
change by asserting that the Declaration remains a “preamble to the Preamble to the
Constitution.” See Kirk, supra note 62, at 1040 (describing William Bently Hall’s view); see
also supra note 147. But see Kirk, supra note 62, at 1040 (rejecting Hall’s view that the
Declaration is a “preamble to the Constitution’s Preamble” because “the Declaration is not
part and parcel of the Constitution”).
155. The only reference to deity, or other source of natural law, comes in the last
substantive paragraph of the Articles. That provision, however, invokes God not as a source
of law, but as inspiration to Colonial legislatures to ratify the document: “AND WHEREAS
it has pleased the Great Governor of the World to incline the hearts of the legislatures we
respectively represent in congress, to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify the said articles
of confederation and perpetual union.” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII, para.
2.
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do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.156
The fact that the Preamble declares that the “people of the United
States” sought to adopt a Constitution to “secure the blessings of
liberty,”157 does suggest that the framers drafted the Constitution as
positive law to protect natural rights of people. This is consistent
with the focus of the Founders on natural rights, and “blessings”
could reflect a belief in a religious origin of those rights.158
Beyond the Preamble, however, nothing in the text of the Con-
stitution, including the Bill of Rights, invokes natural law or a
theistic origin to the document.159 This silence is consistent with the
Enlightenment view that positive law is the means by which society
interprets, implements, and enforces natural law.160
Other provisions, although traditionally interpreted for other
purposes, reinforce the dominance of positive law in the constitu-
tional scheme. The Supremacy Clause is primarily an instrument
of federalism,161 but also reaffirms the positive law authority of the
156. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. See Douglas S. Broyles, Have Justices Stevens and Kennedy Forged a New Doctrine
of Substantive Due Process? An Examination of McDonald v. City of Chicago and United
States v. Windsor, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 129, 155 (2013) (identifying pronouncements by
Jefferson, Adams, and Madison about the religious origins of the rights the American
Revolution sought to protect). Broyles quotes Alexander Hamilton in his debate with Samuel
Seabury: “[N]atural liberty is a gift of the beneficent Creator.... Civil liberty is only natural
liberty, modified and secured by the sanctions of civil society.” Id. (quoting ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
IN TWELVE VOLUMES 53, 87 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904)). Hamilton also said,
The principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those
absolute rights which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature, but
which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and
intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities.
Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain
and regulate these absolute rights of individuals.
Id. at 155 (quoting HAMILTON, supra, at 63-64).
159. The introduction to the inscription uses the standard dating reference of the time “in
the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven,” but otherwise the
document lacks any reference to deity. U.S. CONST. inscription.
160. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
161. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 108, at 403-05
(Alexander Hamilton); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 233-237 (2000) (sug-
gesting that the only source of law through which judges may invalidate legislation is the
Constitution).
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lawmaking branches of the federal government. Article VI, clause
3 of the Constitution parallels the Establishment Clause in pro-
hibiting any requirement that a judge or other federal official be a
member of any prescribed religion; but it also confirms that the law
to which those officers are “bound by oath or affirmation” is the
Constitution.162 The “necessary and proper” clause, in addition to
ensuring that Congress has legislative authority to effectuate other
powers, is an affirmative recognition of the positive law authority of
Congress within those areas of law granted to the federal govern-
ment.163 That authority was reinforced in the implementing pro-
visions of the post-Civil War amendments.164
Even the Bill of Rights, which enumerates some “unalienable
rights” proclaimed in the Declaration,165 includes no express ref-
erence to natural law. The only amendment in the original ten that
possibly invokes natural law—and then only by inference—is the
Ninth, by reference to rights not otherwise addressed in the Con-
stitution.166 Although making no explicit reference to natural law,
that provision has led to modern debates about the legal source and
content of those rights.167
C. Natural Law in U.S. Jurisprudence
Notwithstanding the affirmation of positive law by “we the
people,” natural law continued to influence U.S. jurisprudence long
after ratification of the Constitution.168 The two concepts were not
presumptively inconsistent, especially given the constitutional
162. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
163. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 353 (1819) (upholding congressional power to establish the Bank of the United States as
necessary and proper to effectuate express powers granted in the Constitution).
164. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2 (each
authorizing Congress to enforce the rights guaranteed by those amendments “by appropriate
legislation”).
165. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
166. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
167. See infra Part I.C. 
168. See generally Charles Grove Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial
Decisions, 25 YALE L.J. 617, 625-51 (1916) (collecting and analyzing federal and state cases);
Bayne, supra note 53 (collecting and analyzing U.S. Supreme Court cases); Note, supra note
51, at 494-511 (analyzing cases in various areas of law).
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vision of a federal government with enumerated powers169 and a fed-
eral judiciary with limited jurisdiction.170 States were free to allocate
lawmaking authority in any manner consistent with the Consti-
tution.171 This allowed state judges to develop nonconstitutional and
nonstatutory law based on precedent and judgment given new cir-
cumstances. In the context of public resources, for example, courts
modified the natural flow doctrine of riparian rights into a “reason-
able use” approach that supported more intensive water use,172
replaced riparian rights with prior appropriation in arid western
states,173 and expanded the public trust doctrine geographically174
and substantively.175
That common law tradition, however, did not dictate the sources
of law to decide new cases. Under the natural law philosophy that
prevailed into the early twentieth century, judges believed in
universal principles from which they could deduce the “right” or
“true” rule of law to apply in particular cases.176 Early American
lawyers were schooled in this method of legal analysis through the
writings of Blackstone, reinforced by American jurists such as Kent
and Story.177 Thus, nineteenth-century state courts frequently cited
169. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (stating that the federal
government has no powers except those expressly conferred in the text of the Constitution,
or “properly implied therefrom”). 
170. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
171. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“[W]hether the law of the
State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is
not a matter of federal concern.”).
172. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 49, at 46-47; Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of
Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 53, 81 (2011) (noting that even early
American riparian rights cases did not apply natural flow doctrine absolutely). 
173. See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145 (1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443,
446 (1882); Epstein, supra note 85, at 2357; see also infra Part II.A. 
174. See Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 476-77 (Pa. 1810) (holding that English common law
rule limiting navigable rivers to those subject to the ebb and flow of the tide was not
appropriate to vastly different geography of Pennsylvania, with large, navigable inland rivers
such as the Susquehanna, Allegheny, Ohio, and Delaware). 
175. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983)
(holding that public trust includes ecological values as well as traditional trust purposes of
commerce, navigation, and fisheries). 
176. See Helmholz, supra note 86, at 402.
177. See Alschuler, supra note 53, at 491; Bayne, supra note 53, at 218; Helmholz, supra
note 86, at 401-02; Kirk, supra note 62, at 1039; see also Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc.,
23 P.3d 333, 340-45 (Or. 2001) (tracing natural law in the United States to writings of Coke,
Blackstone, Locke, and Kent, among others).
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natural law to support their holdings.178 Federal judges remained
free in diversity cases to apply “universal” law to state cases rather
than abiding by state precedent.179 Analysts disagree, however,
about the extent to which natural law was the principal authority
for a holding or simply reinforced or explained the justness of
positive law.180
To some degree, when judges reach common law decisions, wheth-
er they use secular natural law in their reasoning is semantic.181 In
his famous proclamation of legal realism, Justice Holmes opined
that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experi-
ence.”182 But even more realistically, common law judges determine
whether existing precedent should apply, and if so how, based on a
combination of reason and experience, tempered by what is fair or
just under the circumstances.183 The same is true when existing
precedent offers insufficient guidance, must be modified to fit new
178. See, e.g., Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1, 11 (1857) (noting that natural law was “an eternal
rule to all men, binding upon legislatures as well as others”); Commercial Bank of Natchez
v. Chambers, 16 Miss. 9, 57 (1847) (describing liberty and property as “fundamental,” “sacred”
rights (quoting Judge Story)); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 76 (1821) (grounding public trust
ownership of common resources in “the law of nature, which is the only true foundation of all
social rights,” in addition to the civil law of Europe and the common law of England); Fisher
v. Patterson, 14 Ohio 418, 426 (1846) (referring to the “sacred right” to which everyone was
entitled); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875) (declaring that admittance of women to the
state bar was “treason against” the order of nature).
179. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (interpreting the Rules of Decision Act
as requiring federal judges to abide only by state statutory law in diversity cases, but not
decisions of state courts, and holding that the law regarding negotiable instruments was “not
the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world”), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
180. See Helmholz, supra note 86, at 409 (“[E]arly citation of natural law [was] ‘not much
more than literary garniture’ in John Marshall’s opinions.” (quoting Felix Frankfurter, John
Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 225 (1955))); id. at 416 (“[T]he law
of nature normally played a subsidiary role in the American cases.... [I]t was cited to support
other sources of law ... rather than to oppose ... them.”). 
181. See Smothers, 23 P.3d at 356 (finding that “absolute rights” are those recognized by
the common law as derived “from nature or reason rather than solely from membership in
civil society”). 
182. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Early Forms of Liability, in THE COMMON LAW 3, 3 (Mark
DeWolfe Hawe ed.,1963).
183. See Note, supra note 51, at 494 (“The principles, standards, and precepts of Natural
Law are continually [applied] by courts ... to the ever-varying circumstances of life.... They are
part of man's nature and cannot be separated from his life.” (quoting Robert Wilkin, Status
of Natural Law in American Jurisprudence, 2 U. NOTRE DAME NAT. L. INST. PROC. 125, 147
(1948), reprinted in 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 343, 361 (1949))).
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circumstances, or when judges invoke equity to temper an inap-
propriately harsh result. Judges make such choices based on an
understanding of human nature and societal norms or moral prin-
ciples frequently asserted as natural law.
Judicial review of legislation, however, which Roscoe Pound
referred to as the American version of natural law,184 was more
significant because of its potential to substitute the moral judgment
of individual judges for policy decisions reached by an elected leg-
islature. In Calder v. Bull,185 Justice Iredell prevailed in the view
that the Court could invalidate an ex post facto law on constitu-
tional grounds but not, as Justice Chase urged, because the statute
was “contrary to the great first principles of the social compact.”186
In Marbury v. Madison,187 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”188 That pronouncement, however, referred to laws
that violated the Constitution, not a judge’s individual view of
natural law.189
The Supreme Court renewed its focus on natural law during the
latter part of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth
century, during a pivotal period in the development of prior ap-
propriation and other natural resources law.190 In substantive due
process opinions by Justices Field, Harlan, Brewer, and Suther-
land,191 however, it did so in ways that challenged the boundaries of
natural law and jeopardized principles of separation of powers, most
notably in a series of cases culminating in Lochner v. New York.192
184. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 36-37 (Transaction
Publishers ed., 1999); Note, supra note 51, at 497.
185. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
186. Compare id. at 388 (opinion written by Justice Chase), with id. at 398-99 (Iredell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the idea that courts can invalidate
legislation “merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natural
justice”). 
187. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
188. Id. at 177.
189. See id. at 178. 
190. See infra Part II.A (regarding the influence of natural law on prior appropriation). 
191. See Bayne, supra note 53, at 228-33, 235-36.
192. 198 U.S. 45, 57, 64-65 (1905) (invalidating state labor law setting maximum hours),
overturned by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also The Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83, 86-87 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
plaintiffs’ position “has some support in the fundamental law of the country”); id. at 111-24
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (arguing that the right to choose a profession is both a protected
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Based on alleged violations of economic liberty, such as freedom of
contract, those decisions invalidated regulatory statutes adopted by
federal and state legislatures.193 The Lochner-era Court sought to
constitutionalize its holdings by arguing that economic freedom was
“part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”194 Dissenting jurists195 and
legal scholars196 critiqued that practice as substituting the Court’s
policy preferences for those of elected legislators.
Federal judicial reliance on natural law persisted until the New
Deal. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,197 the Court ended the
ability of federal judges to decide diversity cases on grounds other
than state statutory or judicial precedent.198 Although also justified
on statutory199 and constitutional200 grounds, Justice Brandeis
pronounced the death of natural law as a source for federal courts
to decide state common law:
The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is a “tran-
scendental body of law outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute,” that
federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what
liberty interest and property right); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139-41 (1872)
(Bradley, J., concurring) (arguing that women should not be admitted to law practice due to
“natural” differences between the sexes as well as “divine ordinance” and that “[t]his is the
law of the Creator”). 
193. See David M. Driesen, Regulatory Reform: The New Lochnerism?, 36 ENVTL. L. 603,
606, 613 (2006) (arguing that modern regulatory reformers share with the Lochner court a
reliance on “economic theory with natural law origins” and that freedom of contract was part
of the liberty interest endowed by the Creator); Horwitz, supra note 87, at 1426 (“The hostility
to statutes expressed by nineteenth-century judges and legal thinkers reflected the view that
state regulation of private relations was a dangerous and unnatural public intrusion into a
system based on private rights.”). 
194. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
195. See id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (objecting to use of the Fourteenth
Amendment to substitute the Court’s economic policy preference for that of the legislature);
see also Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
that state legislative policy should not be disturbed absent violation of federal or state
constitutions). 
196. See supra Part I.A.3. 
197. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
198. See id. at 78.
199. See id. at 71-73 (holding that the Rules of Decision Act requires federal judges in
diversity cases to apply all state law, not only statutory law). 
200. See id. at 78-80 (finding that a different construction would constitute an uncon-
stitutional assumption of state lawmaking power by federal courts). 
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the rules of common law are; and that in the federal courts “the
parties are entitled to an independent judgment on matters of
general law.”201
Erie, however, applies only to federal judicial decisions in areas of
law reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.202 Under
the Supremacy Clause, state positive law cannot override federal
law with respect to powers delegated to the federal government.203
What, then, suggests that natural law has no legitimate role in
issues of constitutional interpretation and other federal law, in-
cluding the use of federal lands?
Since the New Deal, most courts204 and many legal scholars,205
including conservative jurists,206 have asserted that natural law has
been supplanted by legal positivism. Federal courts may invalidate
legislation only on constitutional grounds,207 and the Court rejected
the idea that natural law principles of economic liberty supported
201. Id. at 79 (citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Justice Brandeis cited an
earlier dissent by Justice Holmes:
[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some
definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State,
whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law
of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it
may have been in England or anywhere else.
Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533-34 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
202. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-73.
203. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
204. See, e.g., Attar v. Attar, 181 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (holding that the
role of a judge is not to determine when natural law is supreme over positive law, but to
adhere to and enforce positive law); Indus. Tr. Co. v. Pendleton, 40 A.2d 849, 851 (R.I. 1945)
(explaining that natural law rights are protected and enforced by positive law).
205. See, e.g., Helmholz, supra note 86, at 402 (noting that by the end of the nineteenth
century, “natural law lost its hold on the common assumptions of most lawyers”); O’Scannlain,
supra note 83, at 1514; Note, supra note 51, at 461-62 (claiming that natural law was
banished “first from our law schools and then from the language of court opinions”); see also
Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921,
922-24 (2013) (providing a typology of sources of law before Erie and critiquing the Erie
decision).
206. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.. 
207. See George, supra note 53, at 2282 (arguing that judges lack authority to “go beyond
the text, structure, logic, and original understanding of the Constitution to invalidate
legislation that, in the opinion of judges, is contrary to natural justice” and that the exercise
of such authority usurps legislative power); Helmholz, supra note 28, at 427-28; Wright, supra
note 62, at 464 (arguing that, in most cases, natural law theories are too indeterminate to
control constitutional law outcomes).
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constitutionally protected rights absent a clear linkage to the text
of the Constitution.208 
The second half of the twentieth century and the early part of the
twenty-first century arguably saw a return of natural law reasoning,
but for different purposes. Some commentators argue that, after the
horrors of World War II, a U.S. Supreme Court that had become
reluctant to impute economic liberty into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment209 became more aggressive in striking down legislation in the
realm of civil rights.210 Cases such as Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,211 however, were rooted in constitutional text and principles,212
or in “the text, structure, logic, and original understanding of the
Constitution.”213 To avoid leaving substantive due process jurispru-
dence to the “policy preferences of the Members of this [Supreme]
Court,” and because “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in
this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended,” the Supreme Court
has struggled to articulate principles to guide this inquiry without
embracing the term “natural law.”214
208. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391, 400 (1937) (upholding minimum
wage law for women). As Chief Justice Hughes wrote: “The Constitution does not speak of
freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does not recognize an absolute
and uncontrollable liberty.” Id. at 391.
209. See Note, State Views on Economic Due Process: 1937-1953, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 827,
827-31 (1953) (tracing the rise and decline of the Supreme Court’s recognition of economic
liberty as a protected Fourteenth Amendment right).
210. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil Rights?,
114 MICH. L. REV. 893, 904-05 (2016) (discussing the post-World War II judicial shift from
using the Fourteenth Amendment to address economic liberty to civil rights and liberties);
Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1609, 1632-37 (2001); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for
Substantive Law Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 838 (1993) (discussing the success of
procedural reforms in opening the courts to civil rights claims); Note, supra note 51, at 499. 
211. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
212. See id. at 495 (grounding decision in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (rooting challenge to D.C.
segregated schools in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
213. George, supra note 53, at 2282.
214. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (referring to “those fundamental
rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition’” (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977))); see Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (invoking “those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples”); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.) (speaking of “a ‘principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’”
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The tension between natural law and constitutional law resur-
faced in what Professor George refers to as the “Griswold prob-
lem,”215 regarding the scope of residual rights protected by the Ninth
Amendment. Although the subject of ongoing dispute, some argue
that natural law forms a key basis for the constitutional right to
privacy announced by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut,216 and a series of other liberty interests recognized by the Court
in the wake of Griswold.217 In the diverse opinions in Griswold
itself,218 the Justices debated the extent to which the liberty in-
terests protected in Griswold were manifestations of natural law,219
or were rooted in existing rights, or “penumbras”220 of those rights
in the Constitution. That debate expanded as the Court reviewed
the constitutionality of state laws banning homosexual relations
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) and rights “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty”).
215. See George, supra note 53, at 2270. 
216. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
217. See id. at 480, 485 (holding unconstitutional a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of
contraceptives, even by married couples in the privacy of their own bedrooms, and medical
services prescribing and informing patients on the use of contraceptives); see also Carey v.
Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1977) (extending Griswold to persons under
sixteen years of age); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (extending Griswold to
unmarried persons); HANKS ET AL., supra note 55, at 477-78 ; Harold R. DeMoss Jr. & Michael
Coblenz, An Unenumerated Right: Two Views on the Right of Privacy, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV.
249, 252 (2008).
218. Compare Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86 (recognizing fundamental right to privacy that
emanates from the principles in the Bill of Rights), with id. at 486-89 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (supporting the decision based on “fundamental” rights protected by the Ninth
Amendment even without express mention in constitutional text), and id. at 499-502 (Harlan,
J., concurring) (suggesting that the statute violated basic values “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325));
and id. at 507, 527 (Black, J., dissenting) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of a
return to natural law principles in which Justices were free to invalidate state laws based on
personal beliefs and preferences). 
219. See Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 49, 50-51 (1992) (arguing that the one purpose of the Ninth Amendment, in
addition to constraining federal power, provides a judicially enforceable source of natural
rights).
220. Although the primary definition of “penumbra” is “a space of partial illumination (as
in an eclipse) between the perfect shadow on all sides and the full light,” an alternate defini-
tion is “a body of rights held to be guaranteed by implication in a civil constitution.” Penum-
bra, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2018) https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/penumbra [https
://perma.cc/5GJF-WEE9]. 
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between consenting adults,221 statutes banning abortion,222 statutes
restricting biracial marriage223 and same-sex marriage,224 statutes
prohibiting assisted suicide,225 and others.226 In parallel with the
Fourteenth Amendment debate, scholars continue to dispute wheth-
er the Ninth Amendment is an independent source of rights, and
whether those rights can be identified by reference to natural law.227
Others advocate a return to a jurisprudence in which jurists can rely
on natural law sources, some religious in origin,228 to safeguard
fundamental rights that predated the Constitution.229
D. Natural Law Principles Relevant to Prior Appropriation
Based on this brief review of natural law, three principles are
relevant to this analysis. First, natural law has never been a fixed
concept. It has shifted as relevant to time, place, and circumstance,
from its modern roots in medieval Europe, to its transformation dur-
ing the Enlightenment, to its modification in the secular state.230
Thus, to the extent that natural law is relevant to debates over
ownership and use of public natural resources, it must be analyzed
221. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 565-66 (2003).
222. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
223. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
224. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). 
225. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997). 
226. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (recognizing the right to
procreate as one of the most fundamental rights of mankind); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400-01 (1923) (recognizing parents’ fundamental right to raise children).
227. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in Constitutional
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2291 (2001) (critiquing George’s analysis of the
issue and arguing that natural law continues to provide “aspirational principles” to guide
constitutional interpretation); Massey, supra note 219, at 49-50 (arguing that the Ninth
Amendment is a source of unenumerated rights and that those rights can be informed by
natural law). 
228. See Hensler, supra note 55, at 153 (referring to a revival of natural law tradition for
“at least the last two decades”); Kennedy, supra note 28, at 36, 39 (referring to a “natural law
revival”).
229. See Arkes, supra note 28, at 1254 (arguing that those sources “were usually not
mentioned in the text of the Constitution, because they were truths that had to be in place
before one could even have a constitution or a regime of law”); see also Heimbach, supra note
28, at 685; Kennedy, supra note 28, at 33 (approving of Justice Thomas’s implicit reliance on
natural law). 
230. See supra Part I.A.
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and applied in our current political and social context, not solely
through the lens of a past era.
Second, a basic tenet of natural law is that individuals must
respect and obey the positive law of the society in which they live,
because that is the foundation on which all civil society is based.231
Even the most ardent natural law advocates have accepted that
positive law is the means through which governments effectuate
and enforce rules for an orderly society, whether or not the sub-
stance of those rules is grounded in natural law.232 Even those who
advocate for changes in positive law because they violate natural
law (including basic human rights) must do so through lawful
means,233 or when choosing civil disobedience as their method, must
accept potential legal consequences as the price of their chosen
tactic.234
Third, the Founders omitted any reference to a religiously
grounded natural law in the text of the U.S. Constitution.235 Indeed,
through both the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
and the Oath or Affirmation Clause in Article VI, they prohibited
the use of religion in adopting or interpreting positive law.236 That
left the federal and state constitutions as the exclusive source of
judicial review of duly adopted legislation,237 although it left open
the possibility that judges might rely on principles associated with
natural law in other contexts.238 Those may include common law
matters or other cases not directly addressed by legislation, cases
that require judges to interpret ambiguities or to fill gaps in leg-
islation or constitutional provisions, or cases in which equitable
remedies may be appropriate even in the face of legislation or other
binding positive law.239 Scholars and jurists continue to debate the
231. See supra notes 70, 92 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
234. See John Alan Cohan, Civil Disobedience and the Necessity Defense, 6 PIERCE L. REV.
111, 119 (2007) (“One characteristic of civil disobedience is the recognition by its practitioner
that he must face the legal consequences of his offense.”); Ledewitz, supra note 5, at 97 n.144
(citing civil disobedience cases). 
235. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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precise manner and degree to which that interpretive flexibility is
legitimate or appropriate.
II. PRIOR APPROPRIATION AND NATURAL LAW
A. Defining the Problem
1. Natural Law and Prior Appropriation in Water Law
The prior appropriation doctrine of western water law, in which
priority of right is assigned in the temporal order in which users
divert and put water to beneficial use,240 evolved in a period when
natural law influenced U.S. judicial philosophy.241 Prior appropria-
tion reflected classic common law processes in which courts
recognized that new circumstances justified different legal rules.242
The doctrine, however, was rooted in natural law principles
regarding private property.
In Irwin v. Phillips,243 the seminal California case on prior
appropriation, new downstream miners asserted, against owners of
a canal used by existing miners, the right to enjoy water in its free-
flowing natural channel under the common law of riparian rights.244
The downstream claimants were not riparian landowners; they were
squatters on the public domain, hence trespassers.245 They had no
valid claim to riparian rights, and the Court could have dismissed
the case summarily based on prevailing common law.246 Instead, the
Court reached the same result, upholding the canal owners’
diversion rights,247 through two related concepts.
First, the Court affirmed that the “right” of miners to prospect for
gold on public land was recognized under the custom of the region
absent action by the federal government—which owned the public
240. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 49, at 121-34. 
241. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the Common Law Burdens of Modern Water
Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 485, 522 (1986). 
242. See id. at 521-22.
243. 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
244. See id. at 145. 
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 147.
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domain248—to prevent them from doing so.249 The opinion did not
specify the source of this “right,” but noted that both parties were
equally situated in their status as users of public lands.250 The right
cannot have been rooted in positive property law, under which the
miners were trespassers.251 The natural law rationale for allowing
squatting on public lands, however, arguably stemmed from John
Locke’s “homestead” principle. Under Locke’s theory, individuals
have a natural right to acquire property by combining their labor
with unassigned resources, so long as enough remains in quantity
and quality for others to enjoy similar rights.252 One possible ap-
plication of this principle was that the federal government, in
“owning” public resources, held them for the benefit of private in-
dividuals for later appropriation, and not as a proprietor.253
Second, the Court extended this natural right of appropriation to
water as well as minerals:
Courts are bound to take notice of the political and social
condition of the country .... In this State the larger part of the
territory consists of mineral lands, nearly the whole of which are
the property of the public. No right or intent of disposition of
these lands has been shown either by the United States or the
248. Unreserved federal lands were referred to as the “public domain” until the 1930s,
when President Franklin Roosevelt withdrew them from entry following passage of the Taylor
Grazing Act. See Public Rangeland Management I, supra note 24, at 536, 541. 
249. See Irwin, 5 Cal. at 146 (“They had the right to mine where they pleased throughout
an extensive region.”). All parties admitted that
the mining claims in controversy, and the lands through which the stream runs,
and through which the canal passes, are a part of the public domain, to which
there is no claim of private proprietorship, and that the miners have the right
to dig for gold on the public lands was settled by this Court in the case of Hicks




252. See LOCKE, supra note 92, at 134 (“Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that
nature hath provided ... he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state
nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the
common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer,
no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough
and as good left in common for others.” (emphasis added)).
253. But see Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal. 219, 224, 227 (1853) (holding the state owned gold and
silver just as the British Crown did, and that the federal government held lands in the same
status as private landowners, not in a sovereign capacity).
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State governments, and ... a system has been permitted to grow
up by the voluntary action and assent of the population, whose
free and unrestrained occupation of the mineral region has been
tacitly assented to by the one government, and heartily encour-
aged by the expressed legislative policy of the other. If there are
... many things connected with this system, which are crude and
undigested, and subject to fluctuation and dispute, there are still
some which a universal sense of necessity and propriety have so
firmly fixed as that they have come to be looked upon as having
the force and effect of res judicata .... So fully recognized have
become these rights, that without any specific legislation con-
ferring, or confirming them, they are alluded to and spoken of in
various acts of the Legislature in the same manner as if they
were rights which had been vested by the most distinct will of
the law makers.254
The court thus recognized a “right” to appropriate public resources,
based on local custom and practice and justified by the “political and
social condition of the country,” without any prior positive legal
authority.255
The Colorado Supreme Court took a similar approach256 in Coffin
v. Left Hand Ditch,257 a dispute between a prior appropriator and a
subsequent, bona fide riparian landowner.258 Positive law in the
Colorado Territory when the dispute arose259 appeared to support
riparian rights,260 although the Court unconvincingly refuted that
254. Irwin, 5 Cal. at 146. 
255. Id.
256. The law of prior appropriation in California and Colorado would later diverge, with
Colorado maintaining a “pure” system in which riparian rights were no longer recognized for
purposes of water use and allocation, and California retaining some aspects of both doctrines.
See Lux v. Haggin, 4 P. 919, 928-29 (Cal. 1886); Stephen H. Leonhardt & Jessica J. Spuhler,
The Public Trust Doctrine: What It Is, Where It Came from, and Why Colorado Does Not (and
Should Not) Have One, 16 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 47, 75 (2012). 
257. 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
258. Id. at 444, 447-49.
259. By the time the case reached the Colorado Supreme Court, Colorado had become a
state and adopted prior appropriation in its constitution. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. 
260. As reported by the Coffin Court, one portion of the applicable territorial statutes
provided:
All persons who claim, own or hold a possessory right or title to any land or
parcel of land ... when those claims are on the bank, margin or neighborhood of
any stream of water, creek or river, shall be entitled to the use of the water ...
for the purposes of irrigation, and making said claims available to the full extent
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implication.261 Instead, the Court held that the prior appropriation
doctrine applied in Colorado, prior to and notwithstanding existing
positive law, as a fundamental right necessitated by the arid con-
ditions in the region:
The right to water in this country, by priority of appropriation
thereof, we think it is, and has always been, the duty of the
national and state governments to protect. The right itself, and
the obligation to protect it, existed prior to legislation on the
subject of irrigation.
....
We conclude ... that the common law doctrine giving the
riparian owner a right to the flow of water in its natural channel
upon and over his lands, even though he makes no beneficial use
thereof, is inapplicable to Colorado. Imperative necessity, un-
known to the countries which gave it birth, compels the recog-
nition of another doctrine in conflict therewith.262
The Coffin court did not expressly invoke natural law, but cases
on which it relied did.263 In upholding an equitable interest in an
easement for a jointly constructed irrigation ditch to satisfy ap-
propriative rights, Colorado Chief Justice Thatcher wrote: “[W]here
the climatic conditions are such as exist in Colorado, the right to
convey water for irrigating purposes over land owned by another is
founded on the imperious laws of nature, with reference to which it
of the soil, for agricultural purposes.
6 Colo. at 450. Another section of the territorial statutes provided:
Nor shall the water of any stream be diverted from its original channel to the
detriment of any miner, millmen or others along the line of said stream, and
there shall be at all times left sufficient water in said stream for the use of
miners and farmers along said stream.
Id. at 450-51. Both provisions appear to support the prevailing doctrine in which those who
hold riparian property are entitled to the use of the stream, for legitimate purposes,
unimpaired by those who seek to divert water from the stream channel. 
261. See id. at 451.
262. Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added); see also id. at 446 (“But we think the [prior
appropriation] doctrine has existed from the date of the earliest appropriations of water
within the boundaries of the state. The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by
the usual rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections, artificial
irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity.”).
263. See id. at 447.
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must be presumed the government parts with its title.”264 In up-
holding an unwritten easement for an irrigation ditch against a
claim that it violated the statute of frauds, however, the Colorado
Supreme Court distinguished traditional natural law applicable to
human morals from a form of natural law tied more closely to the
law of nature:
The principles of the decalogue may be applied to the conduct
of men in every country and clime, but rules respecting the
tenure of property must yield to the physical laws of nature,
whenever such laws exert a controlling influence.
In a dry and thirsty land it is necessary to divert the waters
of streams from their natural channels, in order to obtain the
fruits of the soil, and this necessity is so universal and imperious
that it claims the recognition of the law.265
Thus, both the California and Colorado courts treated water
appropriation as a preexisting right, independent of positive law.266
Both courts based their decision as much on the human relationship
to the natural world as on universal aspects of human relations,267
in what in some respects was a prepolitical society during western
settlement. This could reflect either a variation on natural law, or
common law in which courts modified positive law to fit different
geographic and hydrological conditions.
The U.S. Supreme Court invoked natural law more explicitly to
ascertain the rights of individuals to appropriate water from public
lands. In Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co.,268 Justice Miller
construed a federal statute granting land rights to a railroad269 as
264. Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100, 109 (1878) (Thatcher, C.J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
265. Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (1872), superseded by statute, COLO. CONST. Art.
II, § 15, as stated in Stewart v. Stevens, 15 P. 786, 789 (Colo. 1887); see also Yunker, 1 Colo.
at 555 (“When the lands of this territory were derived from the general government, they were
subject to the law of nature, which holds them barren until awakened to fertility by
nourishing streams of water, and the purchasers could have no benefit from the grant without
the right to irrigate them.”).
266. See generally supra notes 243-65 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 243-65 and accompanying text.
268. 101 U.S. 274 (1879). 
269. The statute in question provided:
That whenever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining,
agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and
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recognizing a preexisting right to appropriate water from public
lands:
It is the established doctrine of this court that rights of
miners, who had taken possession of mines and worked and
developed them, and the rights of persons who had constructed
canals and ditches to be used in mining operations and for
purposes of agricultural irrigation, in the region where such
artificial use of the water was an absolute necessity, are rights
which the government had, by its conduct, recognized and
encouraged and was bound to protect, before the passage of the
[statute]. We are of opinion that the ... [A]ct ... was rather a
voluntary recognition of a pre-existing right of possession,
constituting a valid claim to its continued use, than the estab-
lishment of a new one.270
Like the California and Colorado Supreme Courts, the Broder
Court did not specify the source of this preexisting right, but it cited
earlier decisions that expressly invoked the language of Locke’s
theory of natural property rights.271 In Atchison v. Peterson,272 Jus-
tice Field wrote: “And he who first connects his own labor with
property thus situated and open to general exploration, does, in nat-
ural justice, acquire a better right to its use and enjoyment than
others who have not given such labor.”273 Thus, like the California
and Colorado Supreme Courts, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
“pre-existing right[s]” to build canals and ditches on public land,
the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the
decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be
maintained and protected in the same.
Id. at 275 (quoting 14 Stat. 251) (emphasis added). 
270. Id. at 276. 
271. See id.
272. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507 (1874).
273. Id. at 512-14, 516 (affirming the applicability of prior appropriation to miners in the
arid west in contravention of the prevailing doctrine of riparian rights); see also Jennison v.
Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459 (1878) (describing customary law of prior appropriation in mining
camps as “part of the miner’s nature.... [h]e had given the honest toil of his life to discover
wealth.”); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 765-67 (1876) (affirming state right to tax minerals
extracted from federal public domain lands because they had become private property of “the
man whose labor, capitol, and skill has discovered and developed the mine and extracted the
ore or other mineral product”); Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 670, 681-82 (1874)
(reaffirming holding and natural law reasoning of Atchison).
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but more expressly grounded those rights in natural law.274 Accord-
ing to the Court, Congress merely ratified those rights in subse-
quent positive law.275
2. The Analogy to Grazing Rights
Advocates of private grazing rights on public lands have cited the
same right of appropriation as applies to water. Falen and Budd-
Falen argued that grazing preferences under the Taylor Grazing
Act and laws applicable to National Forest lands are a form of
property right entitled to Fifth Amendment protection.276 Stimpert
asserted that grazing permits are a form of property entitled to
procedural due process rights.277 Nelson suggested that ongoing
environmental problems could be resolved by clearer delineation of
property rights in public land grazing.278 Anderson and Hill argued
that contractual or other sanctioned property interests would
enhance economic efficiency of grazing resource use.279 Despite
substantial differences in these claims, they share several common
themes that natural law ranch advocates have adopted.
First, natural law ranch advocates argue that just as settlers
combined their labor with water for beneficial use in mining,
growing crops, and watering livestock, ranchers grazed livestock on
the public range before the federal government had a significant
presence in the region, similarly entitling them to property rights.280
274. See Broder, 101 U.S. at 276.
275. See id. at 275-76.
276. See Falen & Budd-Falen, supra note 21, at 522-24.
277. See Stimpert, supra note 21, at 509-17. 
278. See Robert H. Nelson, How to Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights on
Federal Rangelands, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 645, 649-50 (1997).
279. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 489,
492-93 (2002).
280. See Falen & Budd-Falen, supra note 21, at 507-08, 520-21 (asserting that grazing
rights arose due to prior use later recognized in federal permits and citing a 1905 report from
a meeting between Forest Service and stockmen asserting prior appropriation and “law of
occupancy” rights to graze); Anita P. Miller, America’s Public Lands: Legal Issues in the New
War for the West, 24 URB. LAW. 895, 898, 898 n.12 (1992) (explaining effort to link property
rights to graze to appropriative water rights and citing speech by rancher Wayne Hage);
Stimpert, supra note 21, at 485-89, 494-96 (arguing that the same rules of appropriation
should apply to forage as to water and hard rock minerals); see also Harbison, supra note 54,
at 466-67, 481 (arguing that courts have held erroneously that grazing permits and leases
convey no property interests because those permits convey many of the “sticks in the bundle”
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Whether they justify those rights under classical principles of
natural law articulated by Aristotle, Locke, and Blackstone,281 as a
manifestation of the rule of capture in property law,282 or even under
Biblical principles dating to Abraham’s well,283 natural law ranch
advocates assert property rights similar to those recognized in
water.
Second, natural law ranch advocates argue that, just as western
aridity and geography necessitated prior appropriation of water,
range conditions made public land grazing imperative to the success
of livestock operations in the region, dating to Spanish colonial and
Mexican rule in the southwest.284 As grazing economies developed,
federal homesteading programs allowed settlers to acquire fee
ownership, but only for parcels of limited size.285 Given the acreage
required to support cattle on western rangelands, an economically
feasible solution was to use the acquired land as “base property,”
while using much larger areas of federal land for supplemental
grazing.286 Thus, they argue, just as prior appropriation was jus-
tified based on aridity and dispersed surface waters compared to the
riparian east, public land grazing was necessitated by the lower
productivity of western rangeland relative to those in lusher
regions.287 Of course, the same logic could be used to argue that
grazing is not appropriate at all on public lands with sparse forage.
of traditional property rights).
281. See Nelson, supra note 278, at 645-47 (citing natural law theorists from Aristotle to
Aquinas and arguing that Locke’s theory of property may apply equally to grazing as to other
property, but that the same would be true for other public land uses as well); Stimpert, supra
note 21, at 484-86, 495-96 (citing Blackstone and questioning why ranchers “were not given
the full fruit of their labor”); see also Harbison, supra note 54, at 459 (quoting Adam Smith). 
282. See Donahue, supra note 15, at 731-37 (explaining but not agreeing with the validity
of the analogy to the rule of capture); Stimpert, supra note 21, at 485-87 (discussing prior
appropriation as the logical outgrowth of the rule of capture, leading to property rights as “a
common principle of American property law”). 
283. See Stimpert, supra note 21, at 484-85, 488 (arguing that property rights tied to labor
date back to Abraham’s well as recorded in the Bible). 
284. See Public Rangeland Management II, supra note 50, at 22; Falen and Budd-Falen,
supra note 21, at 512-24 (asserting that the federal government pledged to respect any
associated property rights in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo); Stimpert, supra note 21, at
489-90. 
285. See Public Rangeland Management II, supra note 50, at 16-22. 
286. See id. at 22-30; Public Rangeland Management I, supra note 24, at 541-43; Donahue,
supra note 15, at 735-36.
287. See Public Rangeland Management II, supra note 50, at 22; Falen & Budd-Falen,
supra note 21, at 512-24; Stimpert, supra note 21, at 488-90.
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Third, natural law ranch advocates assert that these imperatives
of the western range led to customary practices that became—or
should have become—accepted doctrine and are as entitled to ret-
rospective legal recognition as was true for water.288
Why, then, should those resources be treated differently for
purposes of enforceable property rights? In Part B, I present several
reasons why the analogy is flawed, and why arguments posited on
behalf of natural law ranch advocates fundamentally misconstrue
key principles of natural law identified in Part I.
B. Positive Law and Public Resources
Despite the surficial appeal of the prior appropriation analogy, it
does not support property rights to graze public lands. First, even
if prior appropriation water law had roots in natural law, it was
later ratified through positive law.289 By contrast, the federal
government chose a different positive law for grazing rights.290
Second, it is unclear whether prior appropriation is a natural law or
a positive law doctrine.291 Third, even if prior appropriation has a
natural law grounding, it must be applied consistently with natural
law principles.292
1. The Intervention of Positive Law
The most straightforward way to refute the prior appropriation
analogy is the intervention of positive law, in which the federal
government adopted, through legislation and judicial interpretation,
different policies regarding the use of water and forage resources on
public lands. The federal government ceded most of its water claims
288. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 279, at 499-508 (arguing that customary range rights
later were recognized as property through local custom and later positive law); Falen & Budd-
Falen, supra note 21, at 511-22 (tracing customary grazing patterns and practices and their
evolution into legally recognized grazing preferences); Nelson, supra note 278, at 646-49
(arguing that customary grazing practices evolved into de facto rights); Stimpert, supra note
21, at 488-96 (arguing that customary practices justified but did not achieve adequate
recognition of property rights to graze). 
289. See infra Part II.B.1.a.
290. See infra Part II.B.1.b.
291. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
292. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
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to the states, leaving each state free to adopt its own positive law
governing water use and allocation.293 State positive law largely
embraced prior appropriation at the constitutional, legislative, and
judicial levels.294 For grazing resources, Congress adopted a dif-
ferent approach in the Taylor Grazing Act,295 the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act,296 and other statutes and regulations.
a. Water Rights
Although one could interpret the evolution of western water law
as an example of common law process,297 for purposes of this Part,
I assume that early prior appropriation doctrine reflected natural
law. Subsequent to judicial recognition of preexisting customs and
practices in the cases discussed above, however, western states
embraced prior appropriation through positive law, to varying
degrees relative to continued applicability of riparian rights. States
did so via constitutional provisions,298 legislation,299 judicial ac-
tion,300 or a combination of the above.
More important was the manner in which federal legislation and
judicial interpretations accepted state prior appropriation law. In
California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,301 the
U.S. Supreme Court invoked the natural law origins of prior
appropriation, but also embraced the role of positive law in codifying
those rights.302 In California Oregon Power Co., a riparian land-
owner argued that a federal land patent issued pursuant to the
Homestead Act303 incorporated riparian rights that protected them
against water use by an appropriator.304 The Court held that
293. See infra Part II.B.1.a.
294. See infra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
295. See Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2012).
296. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1752 (2012). 
297. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text. 
298. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5-6; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 3; UTAH CONST. art.
VII, § 1. 
299. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (LexisNexis 2018). 
300. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443
(1882); Stowell v. Johnson, 26 P. 290 (Utah 1891); Moyer v. Preston, 44 P. 845 (Wyo. 1896). 
301. 295 U.S. 142 (1935). 
302. See id. at 154-58.
303. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862). 
304. Cal. Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 150-52. 
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Congress, in authorizing federal land patents, acquiesced in water
rights acknowledged by the western territories and states based on
appropriation of water and application to beneficial use, as accepted
by local custom and practice.305
The Court went further, however, holding that Congress, in
enacting section 1 of the Desert Lands Act,306 “effected a severance
of all waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated,
from the land itself.”307 This was an immensely consequential ruling.
Under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Congress had
plenary control over those lands, including their riparian water
rights.308 Under the Court’s interpretation of section 1 of the Desert
Lands Act, however, Congress relinquished its riparian water rights
entirely, leaving the nature of water rights—on federal, state, or
private lands—to the discretion of each state.309
The Supreme Court in California Oregon Power Co. retained the
reasoning in Broder that the Desert Lands Act merely recognized
existing appropriative rights.310 The Court quoted Broder for the
proposition that all prior patents issued during this period were
subject to this “existing servitude.”311 Similarly, the Court invoked
the California and Colorado Supreme Courts’ reasoning in describ-
ing the nature of the land and the essential labor deployed by
settlers as justification for the holding.312
305. See id. at 154-55. 
306.
[A]ll surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, together
with the water of all, lakes, rivers and other sources of water supply upon the
public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the
appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing
purposes subject to existing rights.
Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 377 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2012)).
307. Cal Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 158 (emphasis added). 
308. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
309. See Cal. Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 162-64. 
310. See id. at 154 (“The rule generally recognized throughout the states and territories of
the arid region was that the acquisition of water by prior appropriation for a beneficial use
was entitled to protection; and the rule applied whether the water was diverted for
manufacturing, irrigation, or mining purposes. The rule was evidenced not alone by
legislation and judicial decision, but by local and customary law and usage as well.”).
311. See id. at 155. 
312. See id. at 156-57 (“In the beginning, the task of reclaiming this area was left to the
unaided efforts of the people who found their way by painful effort to its inhospitable
solitudes. These western pioneers, emulating the spirit of so many others who had gone before
them in similar ventures, faced the difficult problem of wresting a living and creating homes
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The Supreme Court invoked positive law, however, to determine
whether Congress, in homestead statutes, acquiesced in the prac-
tice: “This general policy was approved by the silent acquiescence of
the federal government, until it received formal confirmation at the
hands of Congress by the Act of 1866.”313 In extending the recogni-
tion to future patents, under all federal land disposal statutes, the
Court held:
If the acts of 1866 and 1870 did not constitute an entire aban-
donment of the common-law rule of running waters in so far as
the public lands and subsequent grantees thereof were con-
cerned, they foreshadowed the more positive declarations of the
Desert Land Act of 1877, which it is contended did bring about
that result.314
Moreover, to the extent that Justice Sutherland cited arid western
conditions and the extreme efforts necessary to wrest a living from
those lands through hard labor and capital investment,315 he did so
as an interpretive tool to ascertain the intent of Congress in
adopting the Desert Land Act.316 He did not assert (as was true in
from the raw elements about them, and threw down the gage of battle to the forces of nature.
With imperfect tools, they built dams, excavated canals, constructed ditches, plowed and
cultivated the soil, and transformed dry and desolate lands into green fields and leafy
orchards.”); see also id. at 157-58 (“[T]he future growth and well-being of the entire region
depended upon a complete adherence to the rule of appropriation for a beneficial use as the
exclusive criterion of the right to the use of water. The streams and other sources of supply
from which this water must come were separated from one another by wide stretches of
parched and barren land which never could be made to produce agricultural crops except by
the transmission of water for long distances and its entire consumption in the processes of
irrigation. Necessarily, that involved the complete subordination of the common-law doctrine
of riparian rights to that of appropriation.”).
313. Id. at 154. The applicable section of the Mining Act of 1866 provided:
[W]henever, by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining,
agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and
the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws, and the
decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be
maintained and protected in the same.
Id. at 154-55 (quoting Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 252 (1866)).
314. Id. at 155; see also id. at 159-63 (discussing the authority of the federal government
to consent to the severance of water from the public domain and the federal government’s
intent to do so through legislation).
315. Justice Sutherland came from Utah, a prior appropriation state. 
316. See Cal. Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 156-57.
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Broder317) that the right of appropriation arose under natural law,
and therefore was something Congress must accept.318
The Court also adopted a positive law approach in its second
major holding in California Oregon Power Co., that in enacting
section 1 of the Desert Land Act, Congress ceded governmental au-
thority over water rights (in addition to federal ownership) to the
states.319 Although the Court discussed arid western conditions to
explain congressional abandonment of riparian rights, congressional
severance of water from the public domain left each state free to
adopt water law suitable to its circumstances.320 In the federal
reserved water rights doctrine, the federal government later
reinforced the concept that it was, through positive law, making
affirmative policy decisions about the degree to which water would
be available for appropriation by private individuals.321 Although
adopted by judicial decision rather than legislation, this doctrine
held that the federal government, in reserving lands for specified
uses, impliedly reserved sufficient water for the purposes of the
reservation.322
Thus, the evolution of water law from the late eighteenth to the
early nineteenth centuries reflected a classic evolution from natural
law to positive law reasoning. Appropriative rights may have been
based initially on Locke’s theory of property, or they may have
317. See supra notes 268-70 and accompanying text. 
318. See Cal. Or. Power Co., 295 U.S. at 156 (“For the light which it will reflect upon the
meaning and scope of that provision [of the Desert Land Act] and its bearing upon the present
question, it is well to pause at this point to consider the then-existing situation with respect
to land and water rights in the states and territories named.”); id. at 158 (“In the light of the
foregoing considerations, the Desert Land Act was passed, and in their light it must now be
construed.”).
319. See id. at 163-64.
320. See id. at 162 (holding that the effect of severing water from the public lands was “that
all non-navigable waters thereon should be reserved for the use of the public under the laws
of the states and territories named”); id. at 163 (clarifying that the Court’s holding did not
have “the effect of curtailing the power of the states affected to legislate in respect of waters
and water rights as they deem wise in the public interest”); id. at 164 (upholding “the right
in each [state] to determine for itself to what extent the rule of appropriation or the common-
law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain”). The states’ freedom to adopt suitable
water policy explains the many variations of prior appropriation and mixtures of
appropriative and riparian rights in different western states. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 49,
at 87-109. 
321. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
322. See id. at 575-77 (holding that the United States, in creating Indian Reservations,
impliedly reserved sufficient water for the resident tribes to live on that land). 
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simply reflected local “custom and practice.” Either way, states
retained those rights as a deliberate policy choice through judicial
or legislative decisions.323 Likewise, federal courts held that
Congress ceded control over water rights on public lands as a
conscious policy choice.324
b. Grazing Rights
During the cattle boom of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, federal public lands not reserved for specific purposes
were available for use by ranchers and others.325 Those lands
remained open for grazing according to local custom and practice,
with the tacit consent of the federal government,326 before they were
withdrawn from the public domain and reserved for particular
purposes.327 Just as courts justified prior appropriation based on
arid western conditions, courts explained the need for grazing on
public land based on the forage needs of large herds of livestock on
lands with sparse forage.328 That was especially important given the
limited size of homesteads that ranchers could obtain in fee under
federal land disposal policies. For several reasons, however, the
analogy between prior appropriation in water law and in public
grazing law, and the resulting implications for property rights, is
inapt.
323. See supra Part II.A.1.
324. See Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State
Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 256-57.
325. See Public Rangeland Management I, supra note 24, at 548-49; Public Rangeland
Management II, supra note 50, at 23-24, 27-29; Donahue, supra note 15, at 737-40; Stimpert,
supra note 21, at 492. 
326. See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1890).
327. See Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 731-33 (2000) (regarding lands
withdrawn pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535-37
(1911) (regarding lands withdrawn for National Forest reserves).
328. See Light, 220 U.S. at 535 (stating that the common law rule “was not adapted to the
situation of those States where there were great plains and vast tracts of unenclosed land,
suitable for pasture”); Buford, 133 U.S. at 328 (noting that common law rule regarding
grazing enclosures “was ill-adapted to the nature and condition of the country at that time”);
Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (noting “[t]he sparsity of
grass and forage in the region” as requiring large tracts to sustain livestock on the public
domain).
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First, even when unreserved federal lands remained open, the
Supreme Court recognized only an implied license to graze until
Congress prohibited it:
[T]here is an implied license, growing out of the custom of nearly
a hundred years, that the public lands of the United States,
especially those in which the native grasses are adapted to the
growth and fattening of domestic animals, shall be free to the
people who seek to use them where they are left open and
unenclosed, and no act of government forbids this use.329
Later cases affirmed that the United States merely suffered the use
of public lands for grazing through tacit acquiescence, and that such
acquiescence was revocable at will.330
Second, although natural law ideology might have persuaded
Congress to recognize property rights in public grazing, it chose not
to do so. Congress did not, in any statute analogous to the Desert
Lands Act,331 sever forage from public lands in the same way it did
with water, or accept the appropriation doctrine to confer property
rights to forage.332 To the contrary, when Congress enacted laws to
govern federal land, it revoked the implied license to graze333 and
replaced the implied license with grazing permits and leases issued
by federal land managers.334 In doing so, Congress expressly
provided that grazing permits convey no property rights in federal
land.335
329. Buford, 133 U.S. at 326; see also Light, 220 U.S. at 535.
330. See Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 352 (1918) (“The [g]overnment has merely
suffered the lands to be so used.”); Light, 220 U.S. at 535 (finding only an implied license to
graze that did not “deprive the United States of the power of recalling” that license); Osborne
v. United States, 145 F.2d 892, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1944).
331. See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text. 
332. See Stimpert, supra note 21, at 503-04 (citing a report that stated that grazing
districts “were removed from private appropriation”).
333. See Chournos v. United States, 193 F.2d 321, 323-24 (10th Cir. 1952) (rejecting a
rancher’s claim to use of public land without a permit).
334. See id. at 323 (confirming discretionary nature of permit system under Taylor Grazing
Act). Others describe the mechanics of those regulations in detail. See Public Rangeland
Management II, supra note 50, at 51-100; Joseph M. Feller, What Is Wrong with the BLM’s
Management of Livestock Grazing on the Public Lands?, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 555, 563-83 (1994);
Hillary M. Hoffmann, A Changing of the Cattle Guard: The Bureau of Land Management’s
New Approach to Grazing Qualifications, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 243, 250-80 (2009).
335. See 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012) (“So far as consistent with the purposes and provisions
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Courts have confirmed that grazing permits convey no legally
cognizable property rights, and are revocable at the federal govern-
ment’s discretion.336 Moreover, courts upheld plenary federal au-
thority over public rangelands under the Property Clause, first to
prohibit physical enclosures and other methods used by some
ranchers to monopolize public range,337 and later to regulate grazing
on federal lands to allocate forage resources and to protect other
resources.338
Ironically, both opponents339 and proponents340 of property rights
to graze public lands agree that the unregulated implied license to
graze recognized in Buford was not sustainable. With dramatically
expanding grazing intensity in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, laissez-faire policy caused widespread deterioration of
public rangelands and related environmental problems, and
livestock industry instability due to the resulting uncertainty about
of this subchapter, grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately
safeguarded, but the creation of a grazing district or the issuance of a permit pursuant to the
provisions of this subchapter shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the
lands.”). 
336. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 489, 493-94 (1973); United States v. Estate
of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2016); Fed. Lands Legal Consortium v. United States,
195 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that modification of grazing permits did not
deny procedural due process because grazing permits confer no property interest); Diamond
Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1404 (10th Cir. 1976); Chournos, 193 F.2d at 323
(“[A] livestock owner does not have the right to take matters into his own hands and graze
public lands without a permit.”); United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293, 295-97 (10th Cir. 1951).
But see Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (holding that,
although grazing permits convey no vested property rights, they are of sufficient value to
warrant equitable protection in proper circumstances); Shufflebarger v. Comm., 24 T.C. 980,
992 (1955) (holding that grazing preference is property for tax purposes).
337. See McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922) (upholding conviction for
using force to prevent passage over federal lands); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,
525-26 (1897) (upholding federal statute prohibiting fences and other enclosures that restrict
public land access). Even before Congress adopted the Unlawful Enclosures Act, the Supreme
Court rejected efforts by some ranchers to obtain monopoly control over public range
resources, effectively rejecting a “rule of capture” theory of public land use and ownership
acquisition. See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 325-26 (1890). 
338. See Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 739-44 (2000) (upholding Bureau of
Land Management regulations limiting grazing); Diamond Ring Ranch, 531 F.2d at 1401-04
(upholding federal authority to suspend or revoke grazing permit due to violations of
regulations and permit conditions). 
339. See Public Rangeland Management II, supra note 50, at 3, 31-32; Donahue, supra note
15, at 724-27; Feller, supra note 334, at 560-63.
340. See Harbison, supra note 54, at 467-69; Nelson, supra note 278, at 649-50; Stimpert,
supra note 21, at 488-93.
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grazing rights.341 In short, the public commons approach to federal
land342 management led to a “tragedy of the commons.”343 During the
Dust Bowl, ranchers were among the most ardent proponents of
public range reform and allocated grazing.344 Regardless of how one
reads the history, Congress made a positive policy choice to regulate
public land use.345 Natural law ranch advocates remain free to
advocate for change in that positive law, but they have not prevailed
in those policy arguments.346
In the face of this positive law, the only claim available to natural
law ranch advocates is that natural law obligated the federal
government to recognize property rights to graze in ranchers who
labored to put federal land to beneficial use during the open access
period. As discussed earlier, however, the U.S. Constitution is the
supreme law of the land.347 Although judges might rely on natural
law to decide common law cases not otherwise addressed by positive
law, to interpret constitutional ambiguities, or to apply principles
of equity, natural law cannot supplant binding positive law.348 The
only possible contrary arguments are that natural law sheds light
on unenumerated rights preserved by the Ninth Amendment,349 or
that property rights to graze are fundamental liberty interests
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.350 Even if one believes in
the viability of natural law in establishing constitutional rights,
however, the argument is weak here.
The strongest potential support for the natural law argument is
Justice Miller’s statement in Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co.
that congressional acceptance of prior appropriation reflected “a
341. See Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 731-33.
342. See Buford, 133 U.S. at 327 (referring to the public range as a “public common”).
343. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968)
(arguing that grazing in a commons, and other common use of public resources, is sustainable
only under conditions of low density because each individual reaps the full profit from adding
more livestock while bearing only a fraction of the environmental costs of doing so). 
344. See Public Rangeland Management II, supra note 50, at 42-47 (tracing the legislative
history of the Taylor Grazing Act and the evolution of ranchers’ position from seeking transfer
of exclusive rights to acceptance of regulatory regime). 
345. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
346. See generally supra text accompanying notes 37-47.
347. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
348. See supra Part I.D.
349. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
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voluntary recognition of a pre-existing right of possession, constitut-
ing a valid claim to its continued use, [rather] than the establish-
ment of a new one.”351 Given that Justice Miller cited this rationale
to explain statutory recognition of those rights, that statement is
dictum at best. It was also consistent with the prevailing judicial
method to bolster positive law rulings with natural law reasoning.352
More importantly, however, later statutes and judicial decisions,
including Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion in California Ore-
gon Power Co., established that Congress severed water rights from
the public domain under its positive law authority in the Property
Clause.353 Moreover, the federal government affirmatively reserved
to the states the beds and the banks of navigable waters, but not
other federal lands.354
The second possible basis for property rights claims to federal
grazing resources, analogous to that in Griswold and progeny, is
that appropriative property rights arise out of other rights protected
by the Constitution, or a “penumbra” emanating from those rights,
under preexisting natural law rights and principles encompassed by
the Ninth Amendment.355 Even without trying to resolve “the Gris-
wold problem,”356 this argument is weak because it is difficult to find
even the penumbra underlying such a right. The Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments prohibit the federal and state governments,
respectively, from taking private property without due process and
just compensation.357 Those protections, however, apply only to
property recognized by positive law.358 The takings provisions of the
351. Broder v. Natoma Water & Mining Co., 101 U.S. 274, 276 (1879); see supra note 245
and accompanying text. 
352. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
353. See supra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
354. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 230 (1845). 
355. See supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
357. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
358. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land
Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 494 (2000) (asserting “[p]roperty ... owes both its existence
and its contours to positive law, local positive law. Property simply does not exist in the
absence of state law,” and distinguishing property from individual liberty and racial equality,
which are “determined without regard to current legal facts” (footnotes omitted)); Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial
Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 304-05 (1993) (arguing that liberty is an intuitive
concept and a “naturalistic” rather than “positivistic” norm, while “property cannot stand
while the laws fall”); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings
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Constitution do not dictate what property rights states or the
federal government must recognize,359 and the Supreme Court has
rejected the idea that grazing on federal land is the kind of property
subject to Fifth Amendment protection.360 Even in the context of
appropriative water rights, which are usufructuary rather than fee
in nature,361 courts have struggled with the degree to which those
rights are entitled to takings protections.362
Moreover, the positive law in the Constitution dictates that
Congress has plenary authority to “dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States.”363 The Supreme Court has held
that the federal government holds said land in trust for all citizens,
and that the courts have no authority to question policy decisions by
the elected branches about the appropriate use and disposition of
lands subject to that trust.364 Thus, the Property Clause created a
far different vision of how public lands would be held in this
country, and for what purposes, relative to Crown lands in
England.365
2. Relevance of Natural Law
A second response to the prior appropriation analogy is that
natural law—even if applicable to grazing—does not support the
claims of natural law ranch advocates. First, prior appropriation
Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 222 (2004) (arguing that the definition of property rights
has generally been left to the states, and “if state law did not create property in the first
instance, then subsequent state action cannot take property”). 
359. See Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, 468 F.3d 803, 806-08 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
360. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973).
361. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 49, at 1, 154. 
362. Compare Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 455-58, 472-73
(2011) (affirming that appropriative water rights are subject to Fifth Amendment protection,
but scrutinizing the exact nature of the usufructuary property right to determine that no
taking occurred), with Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl.
313, 320, 324 (2001) (finding that Endangered Species Act restrictions on water use
constituted a physical taking requiring just compensation). 
363. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
364. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911). 
365. See id. at 536 (“[T]he ‘United States does not and cannot hold property as a monarch
may for private or personal purposes.’” (quoting Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 158
(1886))). 
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may more properly reflect positive law than natural law.366 Second,
there is a compelling argument that natural law applies differently
to forage than to water.367 Because natural law has evolved and has
always been interpreted according to current societal needs and
conditions,368 any application of natural law must reflect the needs
and interests of the American public with respect to public lands
held in trust for all of them.369
a. Applicability of Natural Law
Justices Field and Miller justified prior appropriation in Lockean
natural law terms.370 Professor Donahue discussed water law (as
well as mining law and timber law) as a manifestation of the rule of
capture.371 Her counterpart Marc Stimpert agreed, but argued that
the same principles should apply to forage resources.372 Professor
Richard Epstein, however, has suggested the opposite interpreta-
tion: that the natural flow doctrine of riparian rights373 reflected
natural law,374 while the reasonable use variation of riparian rights
and the prior appropriation doctrine are examples of positive law,
created judicially and legislatively to address different economic,
environmental, and other circumstances.375
Under Epstein’s application of the view of natural law as
predating the state and reflecting “prepolitical” rights and duties,
water sources were res commune376: “Take a plot of land and it is
yours. Stick a cup in the river, and the water you have drawn out is
yours as well.”377 The prepolitical rule allowed usufructuary water
366. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
367. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
368. See supra Part I.D.
369. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
370. See supra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
371. See Donahue, supra note 15, at 731-33. 
372. See Stimpert, supra note 21, at 488, 517.
373. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 49, at 46-47 (explaining the evolution of riparian rights
from natural flow to reasonable use doctrine).
374. See Epstein, supra note 85, at 2350-52. 
375. See id. at 2356-59.
376. Referring to resources not owned by any individual but owned in common, as
distinguished from res nullius resources that are not held in common, but owned by no one
until reduced to individual ownership via occupation or capture. See id. at 2342-43.
377. Id. at 2350. 
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rights so long as intensity of use did not deplete the stream value for
common purposes such as navigation, recreation, and fishing.378
This fits squarely within Locke’s theory of property: the labor
needed to withdraw water from its source, combined with the value
of the water, gives rise to usufructuary riparian property rights.379
Yet Locke also admonished that this right extends only to as much
as any person needs, not so far as to injure common rights to benefit
from the same resource.380
Under this Lockean theory, natural law riparian rights worked
well in a preindustrial world with low population density and low-
intensity water uses.381 Professor Epstein argues that intensified
water uses required modification of riparian doctrine via positive
law (through common law decisions382 or legislation and regu-
lation383) to the “reasonable use”384 variation of riparian rights.385
This made sense in an industrializing world in which economic uses
of water were essential.386 Natural flow doctrine required no state
intervention because water use was limited to riparian land owner-
ship; hence the rule was self-executing or enforceable by custom.387
Reasonable use doctrine required state action—via adjudication or
regulation—to determine what uses were reasonable, where, and in
378. See id. at 2345, 2351. A “usufructuary” property right allows use but not full
ownership or occupation; for example, the right to pick and eat fruit but not to own the tree.
See id. at 2345. In the context of usufructuary rights, a subtler distinction is that a water
source is res commune, while discrete amounts of water within that source are res nullius. 
379. See LOCKE, supra note 92, at 134-35.
380. See id. at 136-37. A strict libertarian analysis struggles with the extent to which
individual appropriation of a common resource increases that individual’s liberty at the
expense of the liberty of others to use the same resource. See NOZICK, supra note 85, at 174-
82.
381. Cf. supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
382. See generally, ADLER ET AL., supra note 49, at 46-47 (explaining the common law shift
from natural flow to reasonable use doctrine). 
383. See generally id. at 243-54 (explaining the shift to “regulated riparianism”). 
384. See id.
385. See Epstein, supra note 85, at 2362.
386. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) No. 14,312 (explain-
ing that strict application of natural flow doctrine “would be to deny any valuable use” of
water, thereby justifying reasonable use principle).
387. See id. at 2352-55. This part of Epstein’s claim may be overstated, because judicial
intervention may be needed if a riparian claims another user interfered with the plaintiff ’s
use. See, e.g., Adams v. Greenwich Water Co., 83 A.2d 177, 179 (Conn. 1951) (filing suit to
enjoin the city from taking water in amounts that interfered with plaintiffs’ riparian water
rights). 
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which amounts.388 Likewise, Epstein identifies prior appropriation
as a positive law response to the poor fit between riparian doctrine
and the geographic and hydrological conditions of the west, with its
aridity and large distances between rivers.389
Prior appropriation, however, can also be explained as natural
law. Professor Epstein delineates natural law as law in which
“emergent customs and practices in the state of nature cannot be
treated as a consequence of conscious deliberation and supervision
by the state.”390 Early prior appropriation judicial decisions relied on
customary practices that evolved, absent formal state action, to
allocate a scarce resource among competing users, and on rights
that predated formal legal creation.391 Justice Field and others
indicated that appropriative water rights derive from Locke’s theory
of property and other natural law principles.392
Perhaps Justice Field and colleagues were simply wrong. They
operated in a period dominated by natural law, and habitually
justified the results they found appropriate through natural law
reasoning.393 If Professor Epstein is correct, those jurists incorrectly
explained prior appropriation by reference to natural law, when in
fact they were exercising positive-law judicial authority, or inter-
preting positive statutory law to replace the natural law doctrine of
riparian rights to suit new circumstances. If so, there is no longer a
sound basis to argue that natural law justifies equal treatment of
grazing and other public resources because appropriation of those
resources similarly generated a preexisting right that courts must
uphold and protect. The federal government, exercising positive-law
authority under the Property Clause, made different policy decisions
that best effectuated the public trust in public lands.
388. See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
389. See Epstein, supra note 85, at 2359-60; supra Part II.A.1 (describing early prior
appropriation decisions).
390. Epstein, supra note 85, at 2343.
391. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
393. See supra Parts I.C., II.A.1.
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b. Application of Natural Law
A second possible explanation is equally fatal to the argument
that natural law obligates the federal government to recognize
appropriative rights to forage. If both riparian rights and prior
appropriation can be explained by natural law, then there is no
universal principle of natural law relevant to this issue, equally
appropriate to all human societies and contexts based on a single
prototype of prepolitical human existence. The natural interaction
of humans with the environment, and therefore the customary,
prepolitical modes of resource allocation predating formal legal
recognition through positive law, vary based on different environ-
mental circumstances. This is consistent with the principle identi-
fied in Part I that natural law has not been interpreted and applied
uniformly over time.394 Rather, through positive law, different poli-
ties adopted differing applications of natural law to suit particular
conditions.395
Indeed, as societies evolved from prepolitical to political, the
concepts of res nullius, res commune, and res publica developed to
distinguish between land and other resources held in common, but
for different purposes. Res nullius refers to property not owned by
anyone,396 and therefore available to individuals to reduce to private
ownership (res privata) through labor. This could apply to home-
steading of unused land,397 capture of wildlife,398 or mining of
fugitive minerals.399 Res commune applies to resources owned com-
monly for mutual benefit, such as a river under the natural flow
doctrine of riparian rights, which individuals may use for specific
purposes so long as they do not harm the res for use by others and
the public at large.400 That made sense for rivers, from which water
might beneficially be used (for drinking, watering crops and live-
stock, or running a mill), but where sufficient amounts must remain
394. See supra Part I.D.
395. See supra Part I.D.
396. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 (1948) (explaining principle of res nullius in
the context of wild animals (or ferae naturae)).
397. See Scott v. Powell, 182 F.2d 75, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (explaining that land can never
be res nullius, except for presocietal or undiscovered land).
398. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178-79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
399. See Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1895).
400. See supra notes 376-77 and accompanying text.
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to support public navigation and fisheries.401 Res publica refers to
resources intended for use by all, such as a public square, park, or
commons. All are consistent with the evolution of property from a
prepolitical to a political world, in which different resources fit
within each category, and different societies may decide how to
allocate resources through different systems of positive law.
That is exactly how the federal government, through positive law,
adopted a different policy for water than for other resources.
Although it is not essential to this analysis whether one agrees with
those federal policy decisions, the distinctions are logical. Given the
mobility of water and the fact that state law governed water use
elsewhere in the state, it was logical for Congress to sever water
from public lands so that all water could be managed through an
integrated legal system in each state, rather than recognizing one
form of water rights on federal land and another on state or private
land.402 The federal government protected its interests in waterways
by retaining ownership of the beds and banks of nonnavigable
waterways on federal land,403 through judicial adoption of the fed-
eral reserved rights doctrine,404 and through the federal naviga-
tional servitude on navigable waters—a doctrine that protects the
res commune in those waterways.405
The federal government’s decision to retain fee ownership in large
tracts of public land reflected an equally rational decision that they
were best managed as res commune because they were valuable to
different people for different uses at various times and places,406 or
in some cases, as res publica under particular statutory authority.407
401. See supra notes 376-80 and accompanying text.
402. The limited exception, noted above, is the federal reserved water doctrine. See supra
note 322 and accompanying text. 
403. See PPL Mont., LLC, v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 591 (2012) (confirming that the United
States retains title to lands beneath nonnavigable waters). 
404. See supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text.
405. See United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 63 (1913) (“All
navigable waters are under the control of the United States for the purpose of regulating and
improving navigation, and although the title to the shore and submerged soil is in the various
States and individual owners under them, it is always subject to the servitude in respect of
navigation created in favor of the Federal Government by the Constitution.”).
406. Under the same logic, other public lands users could assert property interests because
they reaped public land values through labor, such as hiking. See Harbison, supra note 54,
at 463.
407. Congress can set aside federal land as a National Park, see 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (Supp.
804 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:739
Bureau of Land Management manages most of those lands for mul-
tiple uses pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act,408 but since 1934 they have continued to be available to ranch-
ers for public forage under the Taylor Grazing Act, with preferences
to ranchers with adjacent base property, water rights, prior use, and
other factors.409
CONCLUSION
A. Refuting the Prior Appropriation Analogy
Despite its facial appeal, reliance on natural law to support po-
litical agendas, in the western public lands debate or otherwise, is
misplaced and potentially dangerous. It ignores the history of U.S.
jurisprudence and foundational principles of republican democracy.
The simple response to the prior appropriation analogy is that, to
the extent that natural law drove the evolution of the prior appro-
priation doctrine in mid-nineteenth-century water law, it occurred
in the absence of positive law governing allocation of water.410
Through subsequent legislation or adjudication, all western states
adopted various versions of appropriative water rights into their
positive law, and the federal government expressly ratified state
authority to do so.411
Although the federal government might have decided to apply
similar natural law principles to grazing rights, it elected not to do
so. Instead, the federal government made different policy choices in
positive laws governing those resources, consistent with the needs
and conditions of the United States and its citizenry.412 Most
notably, in the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Congress rejected the
appropriation doctrine in favor of a permit system governing public
grazing resources.413
II 2012), a National Forest, see 16 U.S.C. § 473 (2012), or a wilderness area, see 16 U.S.C.
§ 1131 (2012). The President may reserve National Monuments. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (Supp
II 2014).
408. See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2012).
409. See id. § 315.
410. See supra Part II.A.1.
411. See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
412. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
413. See § 315(b). 
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A prior appropriation approach to grazing can prevail only if
those positive law enactments are superseded by principles of nat-
ural law, which is exactly what the Malheur and Bunkerville de-
fendants suggested in their assertion of “God-given rights.”414 The
predominant interpretation of U.S. legal history, however, is that
positive law has supplanted natural law as the means by which we
establish legal rights and obligations.415 To the extent that courts
can review positive law established by lower courts or legislatures,
the federal and state constitutions are the only standard against
which legitimacy is judged, not abstract principles of natural law.416
Even if one accepts the continuing relevance of natural law, that
doctrine itself does not support the right of individuals to declare
their own interpretation of natural law, leaving them free to disobey
positive law.417 Positive law is the means by which societies es-
tablish binding rules, whether or not those rules are influenced by
natural law.418 That is the most fundamental foundation on which
civil society rests. If individuals or groups wish to change prevailing
positive law, they must do so through lawful means.419 In the United
States, we do so through the democratic and legal institutions
established in the federal and state constitutions.420 Although there
is a longstanding tradition of using civil disobedience to challenge
existing positive law when lawful means of law reform fail,421
proponents of that strategy must accept the legal consequences of
their actions.422 Otherwise, their reliance on natural law promotes
anarchy rather than law.423
B. The Public Trust Analogy
For those who prefer a more protective approach to public land
and water management, and other aspects of environmental
414. See June, supra note 3.
415. See supra Part I.B-C.
416. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 70, 74 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 73.
419. See supra notes 93-95.
420. See supra notes 117-19.
421. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 70, 74 and accompanying text.
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protection, the view that positive law has replaced natural law
presents a similar dilemma. Some proenvironment scholars have
argued for an inherent right to a clean environment,424 or for
fundamental rights to clean water and other essential environmen-
tal resources.425 Most notably, the classic statement of the public
trust doctrine sounds in the language of natural law.426 Public trust
principles have been invoked to modify prior appropriation rights
established by positive law,427 and to support protection of a range
of environmental resources beyond the original contours of the
doctrine.428 Conservative scholars have sought to restrict the public
424. See, e.g., James R. May, Symposium on Global Environmental Constitutionalism: An
Introduction and Overview, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 139, 139-40 (2015); Erin Daly, Environmental
Human Rights: Paradigm of Indivisibility 13 (Widener Law Sch. Legal Stud., Res. Paper No.
11-05), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743610 [https://perma.cc/G6KS-ZXGT].
425. See, e.g., Jernaj Letnar Èerniè, Corporate Obligations Under the Human Right to
Water, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, 303, 310-15 (2011); David Zetland, Water Rights and
Human Rights, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2010, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0412/
opinions-sanitation-haiti-human-rights-on-my-mind.html [https://perma.cc/A7JE-UWNK];
David Zetland, Water Rights and Human Rights: The Poor Will Not Need Our Charity if We
Need Their Water, JOHNS HOPKINS WATER MAG. (July 25, 2010), http://water.jhu.edu/
index.php/magazine/water-rights-and-human-rights-the-poor-will-not-need-our-charity-if-we-
need/ [https://perma.cc/TJH5-5VF3]. A recent report by a U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights and the Environment identified a wide range of environmental protections owed by
nation-states to ensure the human rights of its citizens. See Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights and the Environment, U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. OF HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/SRenvironmentIndex.aspx
[https://perma.cc/KZZ7-K38A].
426. “By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water,
the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.” J. INST 2.1.1. Although codification of the
public trust doctrine might suggest positive law notwithstanding the reference to “the law of
nature,” the Institutes were simply a codification of those principles of law that had been
assembled by Roman legal scholars near the end of the Roman Empire, regardless of their
legal origins. See Ewa M. Davison, Enjoys Long Walks on the Beach: Washington’s Public
Trust Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian Passage over Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV.
813, 830-31 (2006). But see Epstein, supra note 85, at 2343-44 (arguing that the public trust
doctrine has been mischaracterized as being grounded in this Justinian source).
427. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty, 658 P.2d 709, 728, 732 (Cal.
1983) (holding that California prior appropriation law embodied in the state constitution and
state statutes must be balanced against principles derived from the public trust doctrine). 
428. See Jack H. Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The Interaction of the Public Trust and the
“Takings” Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and Critical Coastal Areas, 20 VT. L. REV. 81, 86, 94,
108 (1995) (arguing for the use of the doctrine to protect wetlands); Michael C. Blumm & Thea
Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701,
703, 708, 713 (1995) (explaining the expansion of the doctrine to address water allocation and
quantity); Anna R. C. Caspersen, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility
of “Takings” by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357, 359-60, 378, 391 (1996) (suggesting
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trust doctrine to its original contours in American or English pos-
itive law.429
Unless the public trust doctrine has a constitutional underpin-
ning430 or other source in positive law, consistency requires that the
the applicability of the doctrine to protect wildlife); John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part II—Environmental
Rights and Public Trust, 104 DICK. L. REV. 97, 100, 115, 118 (1999) (arguing that the public
trust doctrine supports protection of Pennsylvania’s environmental resources (citing PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27)); Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19
ENVTL. L. 485, 505, 511, 513 (1989) (proposing use of the doctrine to protect water quality);
Ralph W. Johnson & William C. Galloway, Protection of Biodiversity Under the Public Trust
Doctrine, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 21, 25, 29, 31 (1994) (discussing the utility of the doctrine to
protect biodiversity). Most recently, environmentalists have advocated a public atmospheric
trust to combat climate change with mixed judicial reactions. See Juliana v. United States,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1255 (D. Or. 2016), appeal denied, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, 2017 WL
2483705 (D. Or. June 8, 2017) (declining to decide whether the public trust doctrine extends
to the atmosphere); Butler ex rel. Peshlakai v. Brewer, No. 1CA-CV12-0347, 2013 WL
1091209, at *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2013) (assuming but not deciding that the public trust
doctrine extends to the atmosphere, but dismissing on other grounds).
429. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the
Public, 45 ENVTL. L. 337, 374 (2015).
430. Federal courts have consistently rejected claims asserting a constitutional right to a
clean environment. See Lake v. City of Southgate, No. 16-10251, 2017 WL 767879, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 28, 2017) (rejecting claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that plaintiffs had a liberty
interest and a “fundamental right” to health and freedom from bodily harm (citing Ely v.
Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to a healthful
environment.”))); S.F. Chapter of A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. EPA, No. C 07-04936 CRB, 2008
WL 859985, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) (rejecting asserted rights to be free from climate
change pollution and to have a certain quality of life); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig.,
475 F. Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[T]here is not yet any constitutional right ... to be free
of the allegedly toxic chemicals involved in this litigation.”); Pinkney v. Ohio EPA, 375 F.
Supp. 305, 310 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (“[T]he Court is unable to rule that the right to a healthful
environment is a fundamental right under the Constitution.”); Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp.,
340 F. Supp. 532, 537 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (“[N]o legally enforceable right to a healthful
environment, giving rise to an action for damages, is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or any other provision of the Federal Constitution.”); see also Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Eng’rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Two recent Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decisions, however, invalidated provisions or applications of state statutes as violations
of Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, finding that the constitutional
provision imposed public trust duties on the Commonwealth. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v.
Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 939 (Pa. 2017) (invalidating the diversion of funds from oil
and gas leases to nontrust purposes); Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 978,
981, 985 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion) (invalidating provisions of the Pennsylvania Oil and
Gas Act as providing insufficient protection of, or consideration of, environmental values).
This unique state constitutional section provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
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doctrine be justified based on an analysis of natural law history and
theory similar to that conducted above with respect to prior appro-
priation. This will be the subject of a future article.
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
